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Wilderness Airstrips: A Case Study for Using Legislative History to Inform 
Wilderness Management (96 pp.)
Chairperson: LenBroberg
The Wilderness Act of 1964 created a nationwide system to protect some of 
the remaining "untrammeled" w ildlands from development and 
degradation and to preserve them for future generations. Like most statutes, 
the Wilderness Act was the product of political compromise. This 
compromise allowed some anomalies to persist within the system. These so- 
callW 'nonconforming' uses are legally permitted but conflict with the values 
and ideals put forth by the Act. Wilderness managers have the difficult task 
of translating these ambiguous and sometimes conflicting mandates into on- 
the-ground management decisions. This thesis will examine one such use, 
aircraft landing strips, sixteen of which persist in wildernesses outside of 
Alaska. These are aU found in the states of Idaho in Montana.
The judicial system has long employed a process for interpreting ambiguous, 
over general, and contradictory statutes. When the meaning of a statute is 
uncertain from its statutory language, courts often look to the legislative 
history to determine w hat Congress intended. They examine a variety of 
legislative documents, from committee reports to Congressional testimony, 
to aid their interpretation. I present a step-by-step process for interpreting 
statutes, first using statutory construction and then legislative interpretation. 
This process can be employed by the managing agencies as well. It allows 
managers to make difficult and discretionary decisions that are informed by a 
better understanding of Congressional intent for wilderness protection.
This thesis explores the philosophical underpinnings of this process, its 
drawbacks, and its benefits. It examines arguments both for and against the 
use of legislative history for interpretive purposes, and then outlines how 
this process can be applied. It then looks at the legislative history of the 
Wilderness Act and subsequent wilderness legislation to determine how 
Congress intended wilderness airstrips, a seemingly nonconforming use, to be 
managed. Finally, I apply this process to three current management issues. 
Management outcomes are examined using the aforementioned 
methodology. These case studies provide examples of the practical 
management application potential of this process.
11
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
As early as the 1920s, wilderness preservationists realized that although 
wild areas still existed in the United States in a primitive and pristine state, 
they were rapidly being destroyed and degraded. The country’s burgeoning 
population wanted more resources, more places to play, and their own 
private piece of paradise. As a result of these growing demands, the extractive 
industries, development, and increased recreation were taking their toll on 
the last vestiges of wild space in America. Wilderness proponents feared that 
the existing administrative protection of these lands was insufficient to 
withstand the pressures and that legislative intervention was crucial.
The road to legislative protection of wilderness, which officially began 
in 1956, was long and arduous. It took nine years of debate and compromise,! 
but finally in 1964 the National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS) was 
established with an initial 9.1 million acres of wilderness in the Forest 
Service's domain. Today, the system exceeds 104 million acres in four 
agencies, the Bureau of Land Management (ELM), the Forest Service (FS), the 
National Park Service (NPS), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).^
These areas are the cornerstone of outdoor recreation for 18 million visitors a 
year^ and provide a haven for biological diversity and ecological integrity.^
The Wilderness Act of 1964, (the Act) was a revolutionary statement 
that validated the concept of wilderness on our public lands. By creating the
! Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR L. REV. 
298(1966).
 ̂A ldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute, Missoula MT, Unpublished data (1998).
 ̂David N . Cole, Wilderness Recreation in the United States - Trends in Use, Users, and 
Impacts, 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WILDERNESS, at 14 (1996).
 ̂David N. Cole and Peter B. Landres, Threats to Wilderness Ecosystems: impacts and research 
needs”, 6 (1) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS, (1996).
1
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NWPS, Congress not only protected millions of roadless acres from  
consum ptive usage, it also set forth standards for the designation of 
additional tracts of prim itive federal land as wilderness. The Act w as as 
m uch a preservationist proclamation as it was a substantive m easure. It 
substantiated tiie idea that w üd spaces had value, both inherent and  to 
society, by their existence in a prim itive state. With the Act, Congress was 
expressing the nation’s desire to preserve this natural legacy for future 
generations.
The overriding goal of wilderness designation is to m aintain the 
natural and  untram m eled quality of an  area. As a result, units of the NWPS 
were afforded a higher level of protection than other public lands. The 
W ilderness Act defines wilderness as a place ’’untram m eled by m an, w here 
m an himself is a visitor w ho does no t rem ain”.5 However, despite this lofty 
definition and the values set forth as the purpose of the Act, the statute 
contains some anomalies that have detracted from  the purity  of the 
wilderness system.
As w ith any statute, the W ilderness Act w as the product of political 
com prom ise.^ The authors of the w üdem ess bills knew that opposition to 
their legislation w ould be severe, particularly from  resource extraction 
industries, and that compromise w ould be a necessity. They sought to reduce 
opposition by maintaining the status quo. Only areas which m et the 
characteristics of w üdem ess set forth in the Act were eligible for classification. 
The NWPS w ould then m aintain these areas in  the condition they w ere 
found, purportedly prohibiting any further degradation. In areas that had  an
5 The W ilderness Act of 1964 § 3(2)(c) 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
 ̂See generally, Delbert V. Mercure and W illiam M. Ross, The Wilderness A c t  A Product of 
Congressional Compromise, in CONGRESS A N D  THE ENVIRONMENT 47-64 (R.A. Cooley and 
G. W andesforde-Smith, eds.) (1969).
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established history of particular uses that did not fit w ith the idealistic 
language of the Act, these activities were allowed to continue. Because of 
this strategy, many nonconforming uses - from airstrips to livestock grazing - 
were allowed to continue in the newly designated NWPS.
Problem Statement
Wilderness areas m ust be managed in accordance with the original 
W üdemess Act, subsequent relevant wüdem ess enabling legislation, and 
agency regulations. Where ambiguity exists within a statute, this uncertainty 
is carried over into management. In many cases. Congress gave the agencies 
discretionary power to manage incompatible uses. As a result, confusion has 
arisen from the conflicts between the overriding goals of wüdem ess 
protection and the limited exceptions permitted by the Act. This thesis will 
address the assertion that Congress only intended to permit a narrow scope of 
previously established nonconforming uses to continue in designated 
wüdemess. I believe that whÜe political expediency kept wüdemess 
proponents from eliininating some incompatible uses altogether, their intent 
was to maintain use at existing levels, not to allow them to expand.
After looking at the implications of incompatible wüdemess uses in 
general, I will use wüdemess airfields as a case study for this issue. I have 
chosen to examine airstrips for several reasons; 1) the existence of wüdemess 
airstrips is not widely known in both the conservationist and recreationalist 
communities, and 2) the intrusion of a motorized flying vehicle has a 
uniquely visible effect on both the wüdemess character of an area, and the 
experience of non-motoiized visitors.^
7 Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness Draft Env. Impact Statement (FC-RONRW  
DEIS) , Vol. I, at 1-32, 1-36, (1998); U.S.D.A. Forest Service Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness 
General Management Direction , at 0 -1  (1992).
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One definition of a nonconforming wilderness use is "one which, 
legally or otherwise, is not in harmony or agreement with wilderness as 
defined in the Wilderness Act".® These are uses that conflict with the values 
and character forwarded by the Act but are permitted to continue to varying 
degrees. The Wüdemess Act states that there shall be
no commercial enterprise and no perm anent road within any 
wüdemess area designated by this Act and . . .  there shall be no 
temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or 
motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical 
transport, and no structure or installations in any such area.^
However, in the interests of maintaining the status quo, these prohibitions
were circumvented through special provisions allowing nonconforming uses
such as motorboat use, aircraft landing, grazing, mining, administrative
structures, permanent outfitter caches, and water impoundments to persist
under certain circumstances.^ °
M anagement of Nonconforming Uses 
There are sixteen airstrips within the NWPS in the coterminous states. 
These landing strips, found on three wüdemesses in Idaho and Montana, are 
governed by both the W üdemess Act and two subsequent wüdemess laws. 
While not widespread within the system, airstrips can have a profound 
impact on the wüdemess quality and character of the unit in which they 
persist. Negative impacts have been found on native flora and fauna, and the
® Frank R, Beum, Nonconforming Wilderness Uses: Confounding Issues and Challenges in 
PREPARING TO MANAGE WILDERNESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Proceedings of the 
conference, USDA Forest Service GTR SE-66 at 108 (1990).
 ̂The Wilderness Acf, supra note 5, § 4(c).
10 Id. at 109.
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noise and presence of aircraft can significantly impact non-motorized visitors' 
sense of solitude and primitive recreation.
Before the Act's passage, aircraft were allowed to land in Forest Service 
roadless areas. Air access and other uses of these lands were managed under 
the agency’s "U" Regulations. These regulations provided nominal 
protection from consumptive and motorized uses but allowed established 
uses to c o n t i n u e . ^  2  proponents of wilderness legislation wanted even 
stronger protection for wüdem ess w ith a system which would be permanent 
and not subject to the vagaries of adm inistration changes. The W üdemess 
Act created such a system. Whüe more protective of wüdem ess values, the 
Act, like the previous regulations, allowed established uses to continue.
They were, however, subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of 
Agriculture chose to apply.
After the Act was passed, various user groups saw the negative 
potential that wüdemess designation could have on their preferred uses. In 
proposed wüdemess areas with weU established histories of air access, aircraft 
users feared that the managerial discretion provided for in the Wüdemess 
Act would overly restrict or altogether eliminate their favored mode of 
travel. For the two post-1964 wüdemesses that currently aUow air access, the 
further protection of this use was an issue during designation debates. There 
is specific language in the Central Idaho W üdemess Act of 1980 that prohibits 
the closure of airstrips on the Frank Church-River of No Retum  without due 
p r o c e s s . ^  3  L e s s  explicitly, the committee report for the bül creating Montana's
 ̂  ̂ Teryl G. Grubb & William W. Bowerman, Variations in Breeding Bald Eagle Responses to 
Jets, Light Planes, and Helicopters, (3) J. RAPTOR RES. 213-222(1997); Frank Church-River 
of No Retum Wilderness Draft Env. Impact Statement (FC-RONRW DEIS) , Vol. I, at 1-37 
(1998)
12 JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT, at 101 (1990).
1^ This provision provides that; the landing of aircraft, where this use has become 
established prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be permitted to continue subject to
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Great Bear Wilderness contains language further protecting access to the 
single airstrip there.
The ambiguity surrounding this use, and the discretion given to 
managers, has led to conflicts and confusion on the ground. While the 
language of the Wilderness Act indicates that motorized use is incompatible 
w ith wilderness values, section 4(d)(1) creates an exception stating that 
"where these practices have already become established [they] may be 
permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of 
Agriculture deems desirable."! ̂  The discretion contained within this clause 
puts the onus on managers to determine the acceptability of access or levels of 
access to a particular area. The specific language of the Central Idaho 
Wilderness Act creates an additional level of Congressional intervention into 
management which is even more contradictory to the purposes of the 
Wilderness Act.
Analytical Framework
To answer the question of how Congress intended nonconforming 
uses to be managed, 1 propose putting to new use an analytical framework 
that is commonly used in courts of law. Courts have historically used loose 
variations of this framework to determine Congressional intent for contested 
statutes. 1 will show how agencies can use this method to resolve 
controversial management issues. A better understanding of Congressional 
intent gives wilderness managers a basis for consistent and appropriate
such restrictions as the Secretary deems desirable: Provided, however, that the Secretary 
shall not permanently close or render unserviceable any aircraft landing strip in regular use on  
national forest lands on the date of enactment of the Act for reasons other than extreme danger 
to aircraft, and in any case not without the express written concurrence of the agency of the 
State of Idaho charged with evaluating the safety of backcountry airstrips." The Central 
Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312 § 7(a)(1) ; 16 U.S.C. § 1132.
The Wilderness Act, supra note 5, § 4(d)(1).
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decision-making regarding nonconforming wilderness uses. To do this I will 
use two complementary analytical frameworks, the rules of statutory 
construction and the interpretation of legislative history. I will apply these to 
both the original and subsequent wilderness acts and their legislative 
histories. The goal of this undertaking is to provide a substantive foundation 
that wilderness managers can base management decisions on that will be true 
to the intent of the W üdemess Act. I will then apply this process to 
wilderness airstrips, one of many nonconforming wüdem ess uses. The case 
study of wüdemess airfields iUustrates the complexities inherent in 
managing a use which is not dearly defined by law.
The confusion resulting from the W üdemess Act's ambiguity and the 
conflicting mandates of subsequent Congresses, is manifested in several 
current management conundrums. The Frank Church-River of No Retum  
Wüdemess has released a draft management plan that addresses alternative 
management schemes for the W üdem ess’ twelve airstrips. The Forest 
Service has interpreted the Central Idaho W üdemess Act as requiring full use 
of aU airstrips and has so far rejected altemtives that would emphasize 
wüdemess values over air access. In a dedsion which more accurately reflects 
the intention of the W üdemess Act, the Alaskan Regional Forester recently 
rejected a proposal to perm it helicopter access on twelve existing Alaskan 
wüdemesses. In Oregon, the Forest Service recently acquired a private 
inholding on the Eagle Cap W üdemess that contained both a guest ranch and 
an airstrip. Whüe air access has been an established use on this previously 
private land, the federal wüdem ess has no history of air access. The Forest 
Service m ust determine how  to manage this airfield in the context of the 
W üdemess Act.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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With this thesis I hope to provide a template for solving wilderness 
management uncertainties through the use of this analytical framework.
This is a process that could be very useful to both wilderness managers and 
conservationists interested in maintaining management of the NWPS that is 
consistent with the ideals of the Wilderness Act. While this paper will use 
wilderness airstrips as a case study, this process can be applied to many other 
incompatible uses of wilderness, as well as to other issues and statutes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
To determine what Congress’ intentions were regarding the 
continuation of nonconforming uses of wilderness, I will apply an analytical 
process that I have adapted from the practices of judicial interpretation. This 
process involves the use of both statutory construction and legislative 
interpretation to discover the meaning and purpose of a particular law. I will 
apply the rules of statutory construction to all die relevant laws then use the 
applicable legislative documents to better analyze Congressional intent. For 
the case study in this thesis, I wUl focus this process on the discussion and 
treatment of nonconforming uses of wilderness in the Wilderness Act and 
subsequent wilderness legislation. This process provides a sound basis for 
making management decisions in ambiguous areas of policy.
This type of statutory analysis is commonly used by courts to address 
ambiguities or uncertainties in statutes. Analysis of this depth  is less 
frequently used by administrative agencies to inform their managerial 
decisions. Yet this process can be extremely useful for providing a substantive 
and legally informed basis for resolving management conflicts. The conflicts 
inherent in the statutory language of the Wilderness Act between the 
m andate to preserve wilderness character and exceptions that permit 
nonconforming uses of wilderness are just one place where this process can 
assist interpretation and implementation of on-the-ground management. I 
have laid out a process that is explicit and legally grounded. This process 
involves all of the steps employed at different points by the judiciary in its 
interpretive work. The analytical framework I am suggesting to managers is a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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systematic, step-by-step progression from construction to interpretation, that 
provides a thorough and politically defensible basis for difficult 
adm inistrative decisions.
The Nature of Statutory Construction
The purpose of a statute is to provide general guidance on a topic or 
topics. In most cases, statutes speak to "the great mass of ordinary uses" but 
do not provide the necessary clarity for application to specific circumstances. ̂  
It is the role of the administrative agencies, the courts, and lawyers to 
interpret statutes so that they may be applied to individual fact situations.2 
According to the United States Constitution, the only legally effective way to 
express the will of Congress is through a statute.^ However, when a statute is 
ambiguous, overly general, or contradicts either itself or another statute, the 
courts may turn to the methods of statutory construction and interpretation 
to determine Congressional intent.
Statutory construction involves the application of both rigid linguistic 
and grammatical rules together w ith precedent and common law to the plain 
language of a s ta tu te .^  W hen construction is insufficient, interpretation may 
be necessary. The author of The Construction of Statutes, distinguishes 
between construction and interpretation. He defines construction as;
the drawing of conclusions w ith respect to subjects that are beyond the
direct expression of the text, from elements known and given in the
1 Robert J. Araujo, The Use o f Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation: a Look at 
Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57, 66 ( 1992)
2 Id. at 132.
3 REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, at 83 
(1975).
4 Frederick J. de SloovereExfrmsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes. 88 U. PA L. REV. 527, 
528 (1940).
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text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true 
meaning of the language used.^
Other authors expand their use of the word interpretation to include the use
of the legislative history of a statute. For the purposes of this thesis, I will be
focusing on both construction and interpretation in the broader sense,
utilizing all aspects of a statute, its history, and its context in the search for
clear meaning.
At the heart of the process of interpretation is the presumption that 
Congress has a purpose for enacting statutes. This purpose stems from the 
legislature's intention to cause something to happen or to correct some evil. 
Although widely used by courts and legal scholars, the concepts of legislative 
purpose and intent are not without controversy and confusion. Therefore, 
prior to an examination of how this interpretative process works, I wiU first 
explore the philosophical underpinnings of the process beginning with the 
debate over legislative intent.
Legislative Intent versus Legislative Purpose
There has been debate in legal circles for decades as to whether 
legislative intent can actually exist. The question at issue is whether a 
disparate group of individuals such as a legislature can have a cohesive and 
discoverable intent. A famous debate in 1930 between two legal scholars. 
Max Radin and James Landis, examines this issue.^ Radin argues that the 
notion of legislative intent is a fallacy. He says;
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with 
words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable 
number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving
5 EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, at 241 (1940).
6 See generally, Gerald C. Mac CaUum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L. J. 754-787 (1966).
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majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different 
ideas and beliefs/
He asserts that even if one could presume that the hundreds of individuals 
comprising a legislature could have the same intent, there is no acceptable 
means of determining it. He goes on to argue that in the rare circumstances 
that a legislative intent might exist it would not be determinable from the 
legislative history of a statute.®
Landis disagrees w ith Radio's terminology and responds by noting that 
there are two distinguishable types of legislative intent; that of intended 
meaning and that of intended purpose.^ The former is, according to Landis, a 
normal but not inevitable aspect of the legislative process which is readily 
discernible from legislative proceedings when it exists. The latter is often 
clearly stated within the text of a statute. In the ensuing years, the academic 
and judicial debate over legislative intent has often referred to this dispute, 
with most authors on the subject aligning themselves w ith one viewpoint or 
the other.
Within this debate, supporters of Radin have abandoned the use of the 
term legislative intent bu t generally have replaced it with a discussion of 
legislative purpose without clearly distinguishing the difference between the 
two. Supporters of Landis on the other hand, have relied heavily on general 
statements about the meaninglessness of statutes in the absence of an 
underlying identifiable legislative intent.^® The intent of a statute must be 
one assigned by the legislature, this camp argues, for if it is not "intended by 
the law makers . . . the law makers do not legislate".
7 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
® DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 68.
9 James Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. (1930).
10 Mac Galium, supra note 6, at 755.
11 CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 255.
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Since the courts have continued to find this concept valid and to search 
for intent through statutory interpretation, its existence should not be 
dismissed without further examination. One argument against the existence 
of a single legislative intent focuses on the point that legislatures, being 
groups of individuals, cannot have intentions. In short, one might argue that 
only individuals can have intentions, legislatures are not individuals, and 
therefore legislatures cannot have intentions.^ ̂  Examining this argument 
more dosely, however, highlights its deficiendes. A commonly perceived 
precondition of having an intention is the capadty for "purposive behavior".
A quick look at the language used for legislatures shows a popular belief in its 
ability to act as a whole. Legislatures ’debate’, deliberate’, ’enact’, and ’rejed', 
among other purposive behaviors. The average reader dearly understands 
that these words mean that members of the legislature are acting in the form 
of the majority. Yet, to say that the legislature acting is nothing more than 
many individual legislators acting ignores the "legal significance of the 
criteria for determining whether the legislature acted ’.i^ Since the procedure 
for accepting legislative action is not random, the legislature has dear 
parameters under which it offidally acts. Therefore, like corporations, which 
are treated like persons for many purposes in this sodety, legislatures may be 
presumed to be enough like people to a d  purposefully and as a result, also 
have intentions.
The concept of a broad legislative intent ’underlies the very idea of a 
legislative process’ Dismissing the existence of a discoverable intent 
behind legislative action dismisses any connection between the enactment of 
legislation by a body of legislators, and what they express through the
MacCallum, supra note 6, at 764-765. 
Id. at 767.
17 Id. at 78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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language of a statute.^® The fact that the concept of legislative intent may 
have been misused or misinterpreted does not "deny its importance as a 
fundamental presupposition of the legislative process" according to 
Dickerson, an avowed skeptic regarding Congressional intent.^^
The confusion surrounding legislative intent makes it useful to 
distinguish between legislative intent and legislative purpose. The concept of 
legislative intent is usually identified with an immediate legislative purpose, 
while the term legislative purpose generally relates to a broader ulterior 
legislative purpose. A statute is passed to achieve a foreseeable goal which is 
"coextensive with legislative intent" and which, when taken in context, 
corresponds with "legislative meaning’’.̂ ® The legislative purpose usually 
appears within the text of a statute in a statement explaining what the 
legislature is trying to do  with passage of the act. This statutory affirmation of 
purpose does not guarantee that the purpose wiU actually be achieved by the 
subsequent provisions of a statute however. In some cases, spedfic 
provisions may conflict w ith the stated purpose under certain 
circumstances.^ i For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the term legislative 
intent to refer to both intent and purpose, outside of statutorily dictated 
purpose.
Even believers in legislative intent caution that this concept is best 
applied on a general level to statutory interpretation. It is easier to determine 
Congress' intent for enacting the broad purpose of a statute, and more 
difficult to find evidence of legislative intent in regards to specific provisions. 
Dickerson warns that if legislative intent is pursued "relentlessly", the
18 de Sloovere, supra note 4, at 539. 
DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 77.
20 DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 97.
21 Id. at 99-100.
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interpreter may end up creating a specific intent where none actually exists.^^ 
W ith these cautions in mind, I will address different methods for uncovering 
legislative intent and purpose. The following are a variety of tools 
traditionally used by courts of law to determine statutory meaning and 
legislative intent. The pros and cons of each are outlined to help understand 
their usefulness to this process.
Plain M eaning Doctrine 
The plain meaning doctrine is a well-known rule that the judiciary 
applies to statutory interpretation. It requires that where the language of a 
statute is dea r and unambiguous it represents the final meaning of the 
statute. A d ea r statement of this doctrine can be found in United States v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad.^^ In this dedsion the court wrote that;
where the language of an enactment is dea r and construction according 
to its terms does not lead to absurd or impractical consequences, the 
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning
intended.24
Under this doctrine, the best way to ascertain a statute’s meaning is through 
the statutory language. Only when such an analysis would yield ’’absurd " 
results, or the words are undear, can other interpretive methods be used.
The Supreme Court relied on this doctrine in Caminetti v. United 
States 25 where it refused to refer to the legislative history of the M ann Act 
because of the perceived darity  of the statute’s language. The issue at hand 
was whether the Mann Act, which prohibited taking a woman across state 
lines for "prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose ”, 
applied to non-commerdal activities. Although discussion during passage of
22 Id. at 82.
25 U.S. V. Missouri Pacific RR 278 US 269 (1929).
24 Id. at 278.
25 242 U S. 470 (1917).
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the Act clearly indicated that Congress was targeting white slavery, the court 
upheld the convictions for non commercial activities.^^ The dissenting 
opinion disagreed that the Act's phrase "for any other immoral purpose", was 
clear and unambiguous, referring to the alternative meaning indicated 
during pre-passage debate. This case indicates a flaw in the plain meaning 
doctrine which is that judges often disagree over whether a particular 
statutory word or phrase is in fact a m b i g u o u s . 2 7
The Supreme Court decision in United States v. American Trucking 
Association^^ retreated from the rule of plain meaning. This case revolved 
around whether the word "employee" in the Motor Carrier Act applied to 
employees whose duties were unrelated to safety issues. The Court asserted 
that even though the language was clear, applying the literal meaning of the 
words was not in keeping with the overall policy goal of the legislation. In 
what has become a new standard for the application of the plain meaning 
rule they noted that "when aid to construction of the meaning of words, as 
used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law' which 
forbids its use, however dea r the words may appear on superficial 
e x a m i n a t i o n  " .2 9  Thus, if legislative materials can help, this Court argued, 
they should not be ignored.
Canons of Linguistic Construction
Another method for uncovering the meaning of statutory language is 
to use the canons of linguistic and grammatical construction. As indicated in 
the plain meaning doctrine, if the language of the statute is clear and
26 Leigh Ann McDonald, The Role of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation: A New  
Em After the Resignation of Justice William Brennan? 56 MO. L. REV. 121,125(1991).
27 Id. at 126.
28 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
29 Id. at 126-127.
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unambiguous, it should be read literally. When its meaning is not clear, the 
text of the statute may be subjected to construction.3o These canons of 
construction have arisen from decades of case law and can be used to guide 
judicial and agency interpretation. They are only applicable, however, w hen 
the plain meaning is not dear, and they may sometimes conflict w ith one 
another. Their worth is dependent on "how true they are as generalizations 
about customary habits in the use of language 'll  and by their applicability to 
the case at hand. Because the purpose of these rules is to illuminate 
legislative intent, they should not be used to frustrate it.32
The following is a list of some of the most common canons of 
construction used by the courts:
1. W ords in common usage should be assigned their ordinary meaning.^)
2. Where a word has both technical and popular m eaning the popular
meaning shall prevail unless otherwise indicated.34
3. The courts may change the meanings of disjunctive and conjunctive
words only to express the obvious intent of the legislature not to 
contradict it.^s
4. General words should be considered more broadly and specific words more
narrowly .36
5. Noscitur a Sociis - associated words may be used to understand an
ambiguous word or phrase.37
6. Ejusdem Generis - when general words follow the designation of
particular things they should be construed to include only those things 
specifically enumerated.^»
3» CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 315.
31 SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 48.15 (5th Ed.).
32 See generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 5.
33 Id. § 186 at 316 and SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, § 47.28 at 248.
34 CRAWFORD, supra note 5, § 187 at 319.
35 Id. g 188 at 322-323.
36 Id. § 189 at 325.
37 Id. § 190 at 325-326 and SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 47.16 at 183.
38 Id. § 191 at 326 and SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 47.17 at 188.
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7. Relative and qualifying terms apply to the word, phrase, or clause
immediately preceding them, not to more remote terms.39
8. Reddendo Singula Singulis - words in different parts of a statute should
be taken distributively according to their place in the statute.^o
9. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another.41
10. Common rules of grammar may justify the acceptance of one particular
construction over a n o t h e r . ^ ^
11. Courts can abandon the literal meaning of words in a statute only to
achieve an obvious legislative intent.'*^
12. If intention and punctuation conflict, legislative intent should be deferred
to. Courts may punctuate, repunctuate or disregard punctuation only 
to achieve intended legislative goal.44
13. Words unintentionally omitted by the legislature can be added by the
courts to complete intended meaning.45
While these canons have been applied with merit in many cases, the 
practice of using them is falling out of favor. They are increasingly seen as 
rigid, overly mechanical, and restrictive.^^ One flaw is that these linguistic 
rules, like the statutes they seek to interpret, are composed of words and are 
themselves open to alternative interpretations. Sometimes canons conflict 
w ith one another w hen applied to the same issue.47 Thus, the canons of 
construction are just one tool, be it an imperfect one, in the toolbox of 
statutory interpreters.
39 Id. § 193 at 331 and SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 47.33 at 270.
40 Id. § 194 at 332-333 and SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 47.26 at 240.
41 Id. § 195 at 334.
42 Id. § 196 at 338.
43 Id. § 197 at 338-339.
44 Id. §199 at 324-343.
45 Id. § 200 at 345.
46 Araujo, supra note 1, at 98.
47 Id.
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Legislative History
Legislative history is the body of information from which legislative 
intent can be derived. One author defines legislative history as the 
"explanations of the legislators themselves, or the documents officially used 
by them, in the course of making a specific law."^® Relevant history includes 
"all aspects of the internal legislative history of a statute which were officially 
before the legislature at the time of its e n a c t m e n t I t  includes the statute, 
committee reports, relevant debates in the committee of the whole, 
committee hearings, and conference reports. Previous drafts of the successful 
bill, amendments suggested but rejected during debate, and similar bills 
which did not pass the legislature are also given consideration.50 Portions of 
the legislative history outside of the actual statute are referred to as extrinsic 
aids. Legislative history is valuable in that it provides the "authoritative 
explanations of the purposes or meaning of the language of the resulting 
law".5i
Uses of Legislative Historv 
Legislative history can illuminate the context in which a statute was 
conceived and can lend clarity in the case of confusion or statutory silence.
While it cannot be used to change the plain meaning of the statute, legislative 
history can be used to resolve controversy over interpretations of this 
meaning. It can also help determine Congressional intent as to the scope or 
limitations of statutory provisions. When using legislative history to 
interpret a statute, the courts are not confined to the statutory language at
48 GWENDOLYN B. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, at 11 (1972).
49 DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 140.
50 de Sloovere, supra note 4, at 539, 545.
51 FOLSOM, supra note 48, at 12.
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hand, but they are confined ^  it 52 Thus, legislative history may not be used 
to create purposes which do not exist or go beyond the realm of discussion 
held by the legislature. The broader and more comprehensive the contextual 
setting in which the interpreter operates is, the less subjective the interpretive 
process becomes.®^
A primary use of legislative history is to verify hypotheses which have 
been developed on othef grounds. The interpreter should not go to the 
legislative history to determine whether ambiguity exists, but rather should 
be directed there by confusion or ambiguity within the statute.54 Historical 
analysis should not be pursued unless a d ea r need presents itself. In de 
Sloovere’s words, "venturing into the uncharted realm of factual 
backgrounds of legislation . . .  is still a perilous journey, especially if the 
reason for the journey is not dearly  understood."55
Extrinsic aids also help to illustrate the context in which a statute was 
conceived. According to de Sloovere, a careful study of such materials can 
provide "a broad and deep grasp of the contextual implications of statutory 
language for application to cases by the courts."®* Examining the entire 
context of a statute, rather than just the final product, is a valuable aid for 
discovering a variety of possible linguistic meanings, the "evils" which 
prom pted the drafting of a statute, the atmosphere in which it was enacted, 
and the objectives of the legislature.®^
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer lists five circumstances under 
which he believes the use of legislative history as an aid to statutory
®2 Id. at 17.
®® de Sloovere, supra note 4, at 540.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 533.
5* Id. at 528.
57 Id. at 529.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
interpretation can be justified (Table 1). The first instance is when the use of 
legislative history can help the court avoid reaching an absurd result. In 
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co..,®® the Supreme Court looked to the 
history of the Federal Rule of Evidence to reach its decision that Congress did 
not intend a rule to apply solely to criminal cases despite the specific use of 
the term  "defendant".®^ Were just the plain meaning of the statutory 
language relied upon, the result would be an ’absurd' situation where a 
particular rule of evidence would apply only in civil cases.
A second instance where legislative history is useful is to discover and 
correct errors in statutory drafting. In this case, earlier drafts of a bill can be 
instructive.
The third circumstance is to discover any special meaning which may 
exist for a w ord within a particular statute.®® Breyer presents Pierce v. 
Underwood  as an example. In this 1988 Supreme Court case involving a 
federal criminal statute and the meaning of the phrase "substantially 
justified". Justice ScaÜa indirectly refers to the 1946 House and Senate Reports 
for the Administrative Procedure Act which defines this phrase used in this
law.®2
In a fourth scenario, to decide whether a particular case "falls within 
the scope of a word or phrase" the court may need to determine the purpose 
of that word or phrase in the broader statutory scheme. To determine its 
purpose the court may ask, "[g]iven this statutory background, what would a 
reasonable hum an being intend this specific language to accomplish?"®®
58 Bock Laundry 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
5® Stephen Breyer The Uses o f Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes. S. CA L. REV. 845, 
849 (1992).
®0 Id. at 851.
®1 487 U S. 552 (1988).
®2 Breyer, supra note 59, at 852.
®® Id. at 854.
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When the statutory text cannot clarify this question, the broader context of 
legislative history can be an instructive aid.
Finally, when a statute is politically controversial, the legislative 
history can help the judiciary choose between alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . ^ ^
This is the area of usage which causes critics the m ost concern. Often the 
more controversial statutes contain the most ambiguity because of the 
polarized nature of the debate involved in their passage. In such cases, critics 
fear that a reliance on extrinsic aids will elevate legislative testimony to the 
level of law. If the statute is silent or unclear bu t the legislative history 
provides clarification, the historical evidence can provide valid insight into 
Congressional intent.^®
Table 1. Five circumstances where the use of legislative history is 
appropriate.
1. To avoid reaching an absurd result.
2. To discover and correct drafting errors.
3. To determine whether a special meaning exists for a w ord within a statute.
4. To determine the purpose of a word in the statutory scheme.
5. To help choose between alternatives when a statute is politically
controversial.
The use of legislative history has both a strong following and serious 
detractors. In its support. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]here the mind 
labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from
64 Id. at 856.
65 Id. at 856-857.
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which aid can be derived . . .  Another Supreme Court Justice, Justice 
Frankfurter asserted that "if the purpose of construction is the ascertainment 
of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded."^^
Critiques of the Use of Legislative History 
Like the issue of legislative intent, the question of whether courts 
should use legislative history has garnered some controversy over the years.
An increase in the volume of discussion and criticism of legislative history in 
the last decade has reduced its use within the j u d i c i a r y 1981, the 
Supreme Court used legislative history in deciding almost every case before 
it. In 1989, however, the num ber of cases decided with no reliance on 
legislative history was ten out of a total of 65.^^ Despite this possible down 
trend. Justice Wallace noted in 1991 that "the Court’s practice of utilizing 
legislative history reaches well into its past, [and we] suspect that the practice 
will likewise reach well into the future."^® In view of this ambivalence, I feel 
it necessary to examine some of the critiques of this interpretative tool.
The Supreme Court does not have a standard position regarding the 
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Rather, use or dismissal 
of extrinsic aids is a matter of personal belief on the part of the Justices. Some 
Justices vary in their use of extrinsic aids while others are staunch believers 
in either the use or disregard of legislative history. Former Justice William 
Brennan was a firm adherent to the use of legislative history while Justice 
Scaha is "an outspoken critic" of deviating from the plain meaning of 
statutes.7i This predilection on his part, coupled with resignation of
Nunez, R.I. The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as 
Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: a Reexamination. 9 CAL W. L. REV. 128,130 (1972).
67 Id. at 130.
68 Id. at 132 and Breyer, supra note 59, at 846.
69 Breyer, supra note 59, at 846.
70 Id.
71 McDonald, supra note 26, at 121.
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Brennan, his ideological counterpoint, will most certainly result in a 
dow nturn in the use of legislative history in the current Court.
The main arguments against the use of legislative history can be 
summarized as lack of utility, unconstitutionality, controversy over 
legislative intent, historical and international comparisons, and the 
availability of extrinsic aids.^^ The most frequently heard argum ent is that 
legislative history is not useful for interpretation. However, supporters 
counter that "[i]f the history is vague, or seriously conflicting, do not use it."73 
Legislative history does not have to be useful a t all times for it to have value 
in some cases.
The Constitutional argument is two-fold; the "statute-is-the-only-law” 
argument and the delegation argument. The former, focuses on the 
Constitutional fact that a statute is the only legally acceptable way to enact a 
law. This argument ignores the fact that legislative history is not m eant to 
supplant the statute but merely to assist in its interpretation. The latter 
argument is concerned with the fact that much legislative preparation has 
been delegated to statf people and that it may be the work and words of these 
individuals that appears in legislative history documents. However, the 
Constitution does not prohibit Congress from relying on outside groups or 
stciff members for assistance, what it does do is limit the power to legislate to 
members of Congress.^^ Therefore, members of Congress are the only people 
who can and do officially legislate-
The Congressional intent argument was discussed sufficiently above 
and will not be reiterated here. The historical and international argument 
holds that the United States today is unique in its reliance on legislative
72 Id. at 861-868.
73 Id. at 861-862.
74 Id. at 863-864.
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histories. Legislative history was not used in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century in this country, nor is it used with the same zeal in other 
countries. However, the current legislative and judicial experience in 
America is uniquely characterized by heavy caseloads in the courts and the 
availability to the courts and the public of extensive legislative materials.^s
The final argument is that when the courts rely on legislative history 
to interpret a law, it makes it harder for citizen's to plan their behavior under 
that law. Yet courts will only turn  to the legislative history where the statute 
is unclear in the first place. N or is legislative history difficult to find, as is 
often argued. Most libraries have, at a minimum, summary governmental 
documentation, and many large libraries are depositories for copies of all 
federal government documents.^^ in  addition, with the proliferation of 
internet information and access, more and more such documentation can be 
found electronically from any computer.
It is important to remember, as critics are quick to point out, that 
legislative history is "not the Rosetta Stone of statutory interpretation" On 
the other hand, neither is it w ithout value. It can be a very useful tool to 
interpreters if they understand its shortcomings. I will now  examine the 
varying importance of different extrinsic aids to interpretation.
Significance of Different Aspects of Legislative History
The weight given to various aspects of legislative history during 
interpretation varies. While the courts cannot always agree on which 
legislative materials are acceptable, most agree that extrinsic aids should be
75 Id. at 868.
76 Id. at 869.
77 Araujo, supra note 1, at 61.
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both relevant and reliable to be valid.^® I created the following table (Table 2.^ 
which provides a hierarchy of extrinsic aids, from information culled from 
many different sources. The legislative documents included and the general 
order of preference they are given, reflects common use by the courts. It is by 
no means strictly limiting, however.
Committee reports and other related documents addressing a statute 
are generally given the most weight.79 Folsom considers them the 
"preeminent sources" and the court in Zuber v. Allen so stated that, "[a] 
committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of 
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed 
legislation."®^ In fact, between 1938 and 1974, 65% of the total citations to 
extrinsic aids were from House and Senate Reports and the Congressional
Record.S2
Statements made by legislative sponsors of a bill to the whole chamber 
are next in importance. According to Dickerson, these pronouncements 
"reveal a legislative intent more significant than that revealed by those of a 
more casual legislative adherent".®® Where statements are pertinent to the 
matter on hand, they are almost always used by the courts.®^ Sutherlands 
Statutory Construction uses as an example the weight that was given to the 
opinions of the principal supporter of the Sunshine Act in court.®®
Sutherlands cautions, however, that a sponsor may be acting on behalf of a
7® McDonald, supra note 26, at 128.
79 Id. at 128.
®0 Zuber v. Allen, 396 US 168 (1969).
®1 Id. at 186. FOLSOM, supra note 48, at 33.
®2 Id. at 135.
®® DICKERSON , supra note 3, at 73.
®4 MitcheU v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 US 290 (1959), US v. International Union, 352 US 567, 
585-87 (1975), US v. Wrightwood Daiiy Co, 315 US 110,125 (1942).
®5 Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Board, 670 F2d 238 (CA DC 1981).
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private party and not know any more about the particulars of a bill than other 
members.®^
In contrast the views of opponents of a bill are rarely assigned much 
importance. Their statements, "may tend to overstate the reach of the 
provision opposed, [and] are given little probative effect as against the stated 
views, or even silence, of proponents."®^ Sutherlands takes exception with 
this general rule when proponents of a bill have not specifically questioned or 
challenged specific statements by the opposition.®®
Table 2. Significance of legislative documents to interpreting legislative 
history in descending order of importance.
I. Committee Reports
n  a. Statements of sponsors to the whole chamber 
b. Explanations of the Committee Chair
m  a. Committee hearings
b. Statements in general debate
IV a. Statements of members of the opposition
b. Amendments or language rejected in committee or on the floor
On a level coequal with the previous category are the explanations of 
the committee chairperson when a bill is reported out of the standing 
committee to the committee of the whole. In the process of explaining a biU 
to the full legislature, a committee chair must answer specific questions about 
it and defend it against opposition. Thus, they m ust have familiarized
®̂  SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 48.15 .
®̂  FOLSOM, supra note 48, at 35. See also. National W oodwork Mfirs. A ss’n v. NLRB 386 US 
612, 639-40 (1967); NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Packers, 377 US 58,66 (1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. 
NLRB 350 US 270, 288 (1956).
®® SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, §48.15.
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themselves w ith both the bill and the situation in need of remedy. Their 
statements may be taken as the opinion of the majority of the committee.®^ 
Committee hearings are given less weight by interpreters of legislative 
histories. They are generally "concerned with the more diffuse matters of 
ulterior legislative purpose", and therefore less reliable for resolving specific 
questions of statutory intent.^o Some aspects of lengthy or involved statutory 
schemes are only discussed is in committee hearings. Statements of 
individual members during general debate have historically been discounted 
by courts during construction. However, such statements are now considered 
acceptable if they are consistent w ith statutory language and other aspects of 
legislative history, and if they show "common agreement in the legislature 
about the meaning of an ambiguous provision."^'
Amendments or previous bill language that was discarded also plays a 
role in legislative history. When certain words or phrases were either 
eliminated or rejected by the legislature, it indicates that the meaning in 
question was not intended or was no longer acceptable to the m a j o r i t y .^2
Statutory Interpretation and Agency Regulation
Once the legislature completes its Constitutionally delegated task of 
creating a law, the administrative agencies are responsible for writing the 
regulations that will allow them to carry out and enforce it. These agency 
regulations must be based upon the language and meaning of the relevant 
statute(s). In this capacity, the executive branch "often is called upon to
89 Id. § 48.14.
90 DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 157.
91 SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 48.13. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co. 283 US 
643,650, 75 L Ed 1324, 51 S Ct 587 (1931); United States v. City & County of San Francisco 310 US 
16, 22,84 L Ed 1050, 60 S Ct 749 (1940).
92 SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, § 48.04.
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interpret statutes long before they appear in court for judicial c o n s t r u c t i o n .  " ^ 3  
Although their interpretation is not binding upon the judiciary, it is "entitled 
to great weight" and is usually accepted by the courts.^^ Agencies must 
consider Congressional intent in its broadest implication when crafting these
régula tions.^5
Agencies often find themselves in the same position as the courts, 
needing to interpret an ambiguous statutory statement or provision or 
resolving a controversy arising from such an interpretation. In the face of 
such controversy, the agency m ust consider w hat Congressional intent was 
with regards to the particular aspect of the statute at issue. Thus, this 
interpretative process is equally applicable to the work of agencies as to courts. 
Like the lower courts however, an agency's interpretation of statutory 
meaning can be appealed.
Conclusion
While the arguments against the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation have merit, they are outweighed by its potential value.
Although relying solely on the plain language of a statute for interpretation is 
ideal, the nature of the legislative process often creates statutes that are 
ambiguous, vague, or silent on the issue at hand. In such cases, interpreters, 
be they the courts, lawyers, agencies, or citizens, need to uncover 
Congressional intent. The legislative history of a statute describes the context 
out of which the statute arose. This documentation often holds explanatory 
statements which can elucidate Congressional intent for both broader
CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 300,
94 Id.
95 WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW TO USE STATUTES A N D  
REGULATIONS 4 (1975).
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statutory purpose and specific provisions. A clear understanding of Congress 
purpose can inform both judicial and agency decisions. If legislative history is 
used with a full understanding of its limitations and drawbacks, it can be an 
extremely useful interpretative tool.
In the following chapters I will apply this conceptual framework of 
analysis to the specific issue of nonconforming uses of wilderness, focusing 
on aircraft landing strips and their management today. I wiU spend the next 
two chapters examining the legislative history of relevant wilderness acts in 
the context of this analytical framework. Then I wül examine the Forest 
Service’s wilderness policies, controversies arising from the statutory 
ambiguity surrounding incompatible uses, and how this process can be used 
to resolve such issues in  a m anner compatible with Congressional intent.
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CHAPTERS 
THE WILDERNESS ACT OF 1964
Introduction
Before delving into the legislative history of the Wilderness Act, it is 
im portant to understand the historical, administrative, and Congressional 
context in which the legislation was conceived. After briefly examining the 
evolution of wilderness thought in society in general, and die land 
management agencies specifically, I wül outline the history of the Wilderness 
Act itself. Having thus presented the backdrop for wüdem ess legislation, I 
will examine the legislative intent found within this history for wüdem ess 
protection and noncordorming uses. This intent wül be revisited in 
subsequent chapters that apply the previously outlined interpretive 
framework to specific management issues.
Early W ilderness Thought
By the turn of the last century most of the vast wüdemess which had 
made up the American frontier had given way to farmlands and cities. 
Wüdemess was no longer seen as a threat, but had come to represent both the 
power of the young nation that had conquered it and its cultural heritage. 
Having spent three centuries taming it, wüdemess had become "a symbol 
imbedded in our national consciousness - a nostalgia for a lost opportunity".^ 
Early wüdemess phüosophers such as Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir played an 
influential role in the increased valuation of wüdem ess for spiritual.
1 Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964 : Its Background and Meaning., 45 OR. L. 
REV. 263(1966).
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aesthetic, and educational purposes.^ A rise in national prosperity and an 
increased scarcity of wilderness heightened the public's interest in wilderness 
preservation.^
The idea that wilderness was an appropriate use of public land had its 
origins in the early 1900s. Two Forest Service employees, Aldo Leopold and 
A rthur Carhart, were instrumental in the institutionalization of wilderness 
protection within their agency.^ It was due to the work of both these men 
that the agency’s first wüdemess, the Güa, was established in New Mexico.^ 
Another early wilderness proponent was Bob Marshall, a highly influential 
conservationist who championed wüdem ess from the Office of Indian 
Affairs, the Forest Service, and finally the W üdemess Society, which he 
helped to found. He was responsible for institutionalizing wüdemess in the 
Office of Indian Affairs before accepting a position as head of the Division of 
Recreation and Lands for the Forest Service.^
During the same period, a Yale University forestry professor, H.H. 
Chapm an voiced concern over the insufficiency of existing administrative 
protection for wüdemess. He argued for congressional protection of a 
national wüdemess system managed by the current caretakers of these areas.
In 1939, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, 
joined in the caU for congressional designation and protection of wüdemess.^
2 See generally, RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND. (3rd ed. 
1982).
3 McCloskey supra note 1, at 288.
* JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT, at 100 (1990).
5 CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION, at 69 (1982)
6 Id. at 82.
2 HENDEE, supra note 4, at 102.
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W ilderness Regulations in the Forest Service 
In response to this public trend, recognition and protection of wild 
areas was increasing institutionally within the agencies In 1927, the Chief of 
the Forest Service announced plans for a ban on road building and 
development in areas with wüdemess character.® Also in the mid 1920's, the 
Forest Service began to take inventory of the wilderness remaining within 
the national forests. As a direct result of this survey, administrative 
regulation L-20 was promulgated in 1929, providing the first systematic 
protection for wüdemess ever. The L-20 regulation listed permitted and 
prohibited uses for the agency's primitive areas. However, many uses which 
did not conform with wüdem ess preservation were permitted - logging, 
grazing, and some road buüding. These regulations were not considered a 
long-term commitment but rather a form of temporary protection and were 
only nominally enforced.^
A general dissatisfaction with the efficacy of the L-20 regulations 
resulted in the development of the "U Regulations", U-1, U-2 and U-3(a), in 
1939. Bob Marshall was instrumental in the promulgation of these new 
regulations which were aimed at long-term protection for roadless portions of 
the national forests.^® These regulations embodied a phüosophical and 
administrative leap forward in wüdem ess protection and a broader 
recognition of wüdemess values. The USFS Manual for that period noted 
that "[wlüdemess areas provide the last frontier where the world of 
mechanization and of easy transportation has not yet penetrated. They have 
an im portant place historicaUy, educationally, and for recreation."”
8 Id.
9 Id. at 100," la i iuu.
ALLIN, supra note 5, at 82-83. 
11 HENDEE, supra note 4, at 101.
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The U Regulations instituted three land use designations which could 
be applied to existing primitive areas; "wüdemess", "wüd", and "roadless".^^ 
W üdemess and wüd areas differed in size requirements and were established 
by different levels of the administration but were managed identicaUy. These 
regulations prohibited logging, road construction, and permanent structures 
in these areas and banned motorized access except where previously 
established. Permitted uses included grazing, water resource development, 
and mining. Before existing primitive areas could be reclassified as 
wüdemess or wüd they underw ent a review process. During the review 
period these areas were managed according to the new regulations and were 
protected from many extractive uses.^3
The review process proceeded slowly, halting altogether during World 
War By the end of the forties, only two mUlion of the potential 55 
million acres had been classified as wÜdemess.i® Conservationists were 
unhappy with the pace of reclassification and expressed fears that lower 
elevation timbered areas were being lost through this process. This 
administrative protection of wüdem ess left much of the decision making to 
the discretion of agency personnel whose commitment to wüdem ess 
preservation varied. Changes in administration could radically affect the 
course of preservation and created an atmosphere of u n c e r ta in ty .T h u s , a 
push began for a CongressionaUy m andated and secure program of wüdemess 
protection.
Wilderness areas were defined as areas over 100,000 acres in size; w ild areas had 5-1000,000 
acres, and roadless areas were over 100,000 and were managed primarily for recreation, 
however, logging was permitted if provided for in the area’s management plans. The only 
areas that were classified as roadless areas were 3 sections of the Superior NF which were 
combined to form the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in 1958.
13 HENDEE, supra note 4, at 101.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 102.
16 Id.
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The Birth of the W ilderness Act
In 1949  ̂the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress 
released a research document entitled The Preservation of Wilderness Areas: 
An Analysis of Opinion on the Problem. This report, written by C. Frank 
Keyser, was a survey of existing information and thoughts on the wilderness 
idea. Members of Congress had requested this study to provide background 
for potential legislative action on wilderness designation.^^ Their interest 
was spurred by the lobbying of Howard Zahniser, the Executive Secretary of 
the Wilderness Society and an influential proponent of wilderness protection 
until the day he died, four months before the passage of the Wilderness Act.^® 
Keyser’s report supported the need for legislative protection of wilderness 
and expressed concern over the preservation of wilderness under the current 
management structure. It also noted widespread public support for 
wilderness protection.
In May 1955, Howard Zahniser gave a speech entitled "The Need For 
Wilderness Areas", which outlined a specific program for preserving 
wilderness within the public domain.20 Zahniser believed that a cohesive 
program of wilderness protection was crucial to the preservation of the 
remaining wUd areas. A national system would eliminate the fragmentation 
and uncertainty of the prevailing management regime. Senator Hubert H. 
Humphrey (D-MN) was captivated by the idea and inserted the speech into 
the Congressional Record, effectively bringing the argument into the 
legislative arena.^i
17 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC Vol. XX, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess., at 487 (1964).
18 HENDEE, supra note 4,102-103.
19 Id. at 102.
29 ALLIN, supra note 5, at 104.
21 101 CONG. REC A3809-12 (daily ed. June 1,1955).
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Zahniser and his fellow wilderness supporters had three goals for 
wilderness legislation; 1) that it be as unambiguous as possible, 2) that it be 
supported by a united coalition of groups, and 3) that opposition be 
minimized as much as possible.22 The first wilderness bills were drafted on 
these premises. The idea of a congressionally m andated system of wilderness 
was opposed by both the Forest Service and the Park Service at the outset.
These agencies felt that such legislation was unnecessary and feared that it 
might set a precedent for other special interest groups to secure statutory 
protection for their uses, like grazing or inining.23 The Park Service was 
concerned that wilderness protection of their lands would decrease if placed 
into a national system with Forest Service w i ld e m e s s .2 4
Despite agency opposition. Senator Humphrey urged conservationists 
to draft a wilderness bÜl which Zahniser did with the help of the Sierra Club, 
the National Parks Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and the 
Wildlife Management Institute.25 The wilderness proposal produced by this 
coalition became the first wilderness bill introduced in the United States 
Congress in 1956. Passage of wilderness legislation, however, would be a long 
time in coming.
Legislative History of the Wilderness Act
Sum mary
During the. nine years it took for a wilderness bill to successfully 
emerge from Congress, 65 different wilderness bills were introduced. A total 
of eighteen hearings were held across the country, hundreds of witnesses
22 HENDEE, supra note 4, at 103.
23 Id.
24 a l l i n ,  supra note 5, at 110.
25 HENDEE, supra note 4, at 104.
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spoke, and thousands of pages of testimony were produced.^^ Over the course 
of those years, many changes were wrought to the bill so that the final law 
differed substantially from Zahniser's original draft. Through each successive 
attempt, more compromises were made and more opposition to the bül was 
removed until passage was finally possible in 1964.
The original wilderness bUl included for study 65 million acres of lands 
of the Park Service, the Forest Service, the National Wildlife Refuges and 
Game Reserves, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.^^ All designated Forest 
Service wilderness, wild, and canoe areas would immediately become part of 
the new wilderness system and primitive areas would be temporarily 
included .28 In its final form, the NWPS of 1964 would include only 9.1 
million acres of these Forest Service wildemess-type areas, w ith the 
remaining Primitive areas slated for wilderness study.29
Thé first bUls prohibited development, logging, new mining, dams, 
roads, aircraft, motorboat use, and commercial enterprise. They set up  a 
National Wilderness Preservation Council which was eventually removed. 
This was to be a group of agency heads and conservationists charged with 
reviewing wilderness recommendations and advising Congress and the 
administration on designation decisions. In these early versions of the 
legislation, the executive branch was given the power to make allocation 
decisions subject to Congressional veto. The allocation issue became a 
sticking point throughout the later years of debate.^® This balance of power
26 McCloskey, supra note 1, at 298.
27 j a c k  M. HESSION, t h e  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WILDERNESS ACT, at 16 
(1967).
28 Id. at 18.
29 The Wilderness Act of 1964 § 3(2)(b) 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.
30 HESSION, supra note 27, at 98-103.
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was reversed by the final bill which gave Congress the pow er of affirmative 
action on wilderness designation.^ i
The Earlv. Years of Debate 
In July of 1956, Humphrey and nine other Senators introduced the first 
piece of wilderness preservation legislation in the Senate. Four days later. 
Representative John Saylor (R-PA) introduced identical companion 
legislation in the House.32 While no action was taken on any of these bills 
due to the late date in the session, it was an im portant first step on the long 
road to eventual passage.33 The first hearings were held on wüdem ess 
preservation proposals durm g 1957. The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee, chaired by James Murray (D-MT), held hearings on two bills, S.
1176 and S. 4028; the former was opposed by the Departments of Agriculture 
and the Interior, and the latter was endorsed with reservations.^* The House 
Interior Committee also held hearings on wüdemess legislation but no record 
of these hearings was pubUshed.^s Support for the creation of a wüdem ess 
system continued to grow, with letters regarding the legislation running 20 to 
1 in favor of wüdemess preservation.^^ In 1959, hearings were held by the 
House Interior Committee, under the leadership of Wayne AspinaU (D-CO) 
who would be a formidable opponent of wüdemess legislation over the next 
six years. The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee also held 
hearings but no büls were reported to the floor of either house that year.^^
The Wilderness Act, supra note 29, at § 3(b).
32 a l l i n ,  supra note 5, at 107. [S. 4013 and H.R. 11703.]
33 Id. at 108.
34 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 17, at 489.
35 HESSION, supra note 27, at 14, 93.
Wilderness Preservation System, 1958, Hairing on S. 4028 Before the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., at 21.
37 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 17, at 489.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
Le^slative Success 
1961 dawned a positive year for wilderness legislation. Clinton 
Anderson (D-NM) took over as chair of the Senate Interior Committee, 
introducing wilderness bül S. 174 almost immediately. The newly elected 
President John F. Kennedy urged passage of wüdemess legislation in his 
natural resources message to Congress. Both the Secretaries of Interior and 
Agriculture, Stewart Udall and OrviUe Freeman, endorsed S. 174 completely 
after years of reservations.^® The Department of Agriculture wrote that 
"enactment of S. 174 would be desirable resource legislation and in the 
national interest".®^ UdaU stated that the administration was "deeply 
committed to the enactment of a bül simÜar [to this]".*® With Frank Church 
(D ID), acting as the floor manager, thé biU was passed by a vote of 83-13 on 
September sixth.* '
No paraUel steps were taken in the House, however, and the biU once 
again faüed to become law. The foUowing year, the House Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee held hearings on their own version of the 
wüdemess bül, H. 776; a measure which was widely criticized by the 
conservation community. On August 9, the House Public Lands 
Subcommittee reported their altered version of this biU, which permitted 
m ining to the fuU committee. It was reported out of committee to the 
House under a suspension of rules oh August 30, a maneuver which blocked 
the addition of any new amendments. The biU’s supporters were unable to
3® HESSION, supra note 27, at 72.
Wilderness Preservation System, 1961: Hearings on S. 174 Before the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 15.
*0 Id. at 18.
*  ̂Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 8,1961, at 1565.
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gather the necessary two-thirds majority for passage under suspended rules 
and the measure failed.*^
The Senate once again took the lead on this legislation in 1963, passing
S. 4 w ith the fuU backing of the Kennedy administration. This biU was 
virtuaUy identical to the successful Senate bUl of 1961. Strong opposition to 
wilderness legislation in the House, however, precluded passage once again.
In his budget message in January of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson 
specificaUy requested the passage of wilderness legislation during the 
upcoming year.43 The House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee once 
again held hearings and finaUy reported a bUl to the floor in July of 1964. The 
Senate passed S. 4 by a voice vote once the House took action, and in August a 
conference report on the biU successfully passed both houses. On September 
3, 1964, after nine years of debate, revisions, and countless hours of hearings, 
PubUc Law 88-577, the Wilderness Act, was signed into law by President
J o h n s o n . 4 4
The Wilderness Act of 1964
Throughout the nine years of its maturation, the Wilderness Act went 
through many alterations, both minor and major, while maintaining its 
fundamental outline. Its long title reads "An Act: To establish a National 
Wilderness Preservation System for the permanent good of the whole people, 
and for other purposes." The second section of the bill is a statement of 
policy, followed by a definition of "wilderness" in the context of this 
legislation. The Act refers to wilderness as an area which is "untrammeled by
4 2  I d .
43 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 17, at 490.
4 4  I d .  a t  4 8 5 .
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man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain".*^ Then the 
definition is narrowed down to four characteristics of a potential wüdem ess 
area. To qualify for wüdemess designation an area must be; (1) primarily 
unaffected by the work of man, (2) have "outstanding opportunities for 
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation", (3) be more than 
5,000 acres or large enough "to make practicable its preservation and use in an 
unimpaired condition, and (4) it may also have "ecological, geological, or 
other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value".^^
Section 3 of the Act deals with the extent of the system; which lands 
would immediately become wüdemess and which would be studied for later 
inclusion, how wilderness would be classified, who was responsible for 
desi^a tion , and the methods for modifying the wüdemess system. Section 4, 
"Use of wüdemess areas", first indicates that the purposes of the Act are 
"within and supplemental to" the present uses of the land and that the Act 
does not interfere with certain existing statutes. Section 4(b) informs land 
managers that they are responsible for "preserving the wüdemess character of 
the area" and that the wüdemess under their care "shaU be devoted to the 
public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, 
and historical use."47
The foUowing two subsections address acceptable uses of wüdemess. 
Section 4(c), "Prohibition of certain uses", states that within designated 
wüdemess there would be no "use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment, 
or motorboats, or landing of aircraft". This is foUowed by an exception in 
4(d)(1) that aUows that;
The Wilderness Act, supra note 29, § 2(c).
46 Id.
47 Id. § 4(b).
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Within wilderness areas designated by this Act the use of aircraft or 
motorboats where these practices have already become established may 
be permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of 
Agriculture deems desirable.**®
This is the section of most interest to this paper, as it deals with the guidelines
for aircraft use within wilderness areas, and is the one I wül return to. The
final section explains the provisions affecting private or state landholders
within wüdemess areas, and finaUy, the last section governs protocol for the
acceptance of gifts, bequests, and contributions to the NWPS.
The W ilderness Concept According to the Original Sponsors
As outlined in Chapter Two, the statements of a statute’s primary 
proponents, particularly members of the committee which considered the 
bül, are one of the most convincing indicators of Congressional intent.
These are the members of Congress who had the strongest working 
knowledge of a statute and who have taken part in the machinations of the 
committee's work and have the most exposure to the statute. Statements 
made before the committee of the whole hold the most weight, foUowed by 
statements within the considering committee. Statements from hearings on 
a bill can be useful when they touch upon an aspect of the proposed 
legislation which is not debated by the whole.
Thus Congressional intent behind wilderness legislation can be 
elucidated by the words of its sponsors and major proponents. The 
statements of these individuals present a clear view of what they hoped to 
preserve with the creation of a wüdemess preservation system and why they 
felt such a system was needed. They spoke of the values of wüdemess and 
the qualities which make a wüdemess experience unique and important.
48 Id. § 4(d)(1).
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They also provide some explanation and justification for their emphasis on 
maintaining the status quo on lands entering the wilderness system.
A main goal of wilderness legislation was to protect areas with 
wilderness chcu*acter from the pressures of an expanding population. In the 
words of Senator Humphrey, a principal sponsor of wilderness legislation in 
the Senate;
Our civilization moves fast. Our population pressures are growing.
The time when we have the opportunity to provide for the 
preservation of wilderness without having to interfere w ith other 
programs will not be with us for long.^^
He and the other proponents felt that many existing wilderness areas were
"in a precarious position because [they] lack adequate legal protection against
pressures for commercial and exploitative encroachments." A major
assumption behind the legislation was that, in the words of sponsor
Representative John Saylor (R-PA), "our civilization is such that no areas will
persist unexploited or underdeveloped except those that are deliberately set
aside and faithfully p r o t e c t e d '  .̂ o
Senator Morse, a co-sponsor of the original wilderness bill sang the
praises of the wüdemess experience on the floor of the Senate, emphasizing
the proximity to "God Almighty" that can be found in primitive areas. In his
words;
We cannot justify, in our generation, the destruction of these great 
areas of wüdemess . . . .  There is no timber interest, there is no mining 
interest, there is no grazing interest, there is no economic interest that, 
in my judgment, has any right to be placed above the great need of 
preserving one of the great spiritual strengths of America which is to 
be found in these untouched and untapped wüderness areas .51
Wilderness Presermtion System, 1957, Hearing on S. 1176 Before the Senate Committee on 
Insular and Interior Affairs, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., at 30.
50 Id. at 276.
51 107 CONG. REC. S18353 (daily ed. September 6,1961).
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Several proponents addressed themselves to the opposition and w hat 
one member termed "gross misconceptions" of w hat the legislation would 
actually do.52 Morse emphasized that units of the proposed system were areas 
1) already in federal ownership, 2) within agencies with purposes consistent 
w ith wüdemess preservation, and 3) that have maintained their wilderness 
condition while serving the public purposes of their park, forest, or refuge.
He assured skeptics that "no new Federal lands will be created, and no new 
wüdemess areas wül be created by this bül".53
As mentioned above, die proposed system was carefully crafted to 
minimize opposition by not reaching too far. Supporters wished to protect 
the qualities and characteristics of existing wüdemess areas within the public 
domain but could not do so if their bill was politicaUy untenable. The NWPS 
would maintain the status quo of the time of designation in these areas, 
protecting them from further degradation and development. Frank Church, 
a long time wüdemess supporter and member of the Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee, asserted that ”[n]o one wül be adversely affected by 
passage of the bül. It has been carefully drawn to give all possible protection 
to the economic interests of the West."^^
As to the quality of the resource they sought to protect. Senator 
Humphrey clarified his definition of wüdemess as "the native condition of 
the area, undeveloped, so to speak, untouched by the hand of man or his
Id. Senator Frank Church.
53 Id. at 518352.
54 Id. at S18354.
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mechanical products" .55 His definition incorporates an absence of 
mechanization as a core ingredient. He saw wilderness as a place "for people 
to make their way into . . .  without all of the so-called advances of 
m odernization and technology".®^ He feared that "pressures for roads and 
non-wüdem ess recreational and tourist developments threaten in many 
places to destroy the primeval back-country wildemess".®^
Church spoke directly to the issue of nonconforming wüdem ess uses 
in his statement to the Senate;
Since uses inconsistent w ith wilderness eliminate w ildem ^s, it is 
logical to conclude that if we want wilderness we shall have to exclude 
such incompatible uses in areas to be preserved as wilderness. Such a 
procedure is completely consistent with a multiple-use philosophy.5®
The preceding comments demonstrate some of the ideals that were
behind the long battle for a unified system of wilderness protection.
Common themes found in the rhetoric of the sponsors include the need to
preserve a certain quality of wilderness for future generations. This quality is
more than just a physical characteristic of the land, but also encompasses the
challenge to the hum an spirit to travel primitively and be free from
reminders of mechanized society. These statements bolster the firm
preservationist language of the final Wilderness Act and must be taken into
account when balancing the various ambiguities found within the statute as.
The Evolution of "Special Provisions"
By the time the first draft of the Wilderness Act appeared in the Senate 
in 1956, the bill had been shaped by years of thought and planning by
55 Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 49, at 19.
56 Id. at 20.
57 Id. at 26.
58 107 CONG. REG., supra note 51, at S18355.
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conservationists. It is im portant to look to that first draft for the original 
intent of the legislation. As mentioned above, the drafters tried to write a bill 
which would eliminate opposition to the proposal and avoid ambiguity. 
Subsequent substantive changes to the bill reflect the multitude of 
compromises necessary for passage. I will now focus on how the specific 
sections governing aircraft and other motorized uses in wilderness areas 
changed over time.
Section 3 of the draft version presented to the Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee, entitled "Special Provisions", (b) read;
Within such areas, except as otherwise provided in this section and in 
section 2 of this act, there shall be no road, nor any use of motor 
vehicles, or motorboats or landing of aircraft, nor any other mechanical 
transport or delivery of persons or supplies . . .  in excess of the 
minimum required for ttie administration of the area for the purposes 
of this act.59
This section provides guidance for limiting these uses. Section 3(c) addresses 
exceptions to these guidelines,
the use of aircraft or motorboats where these practices have already 
become well established may be permitted to continue, subject to such 
restrictions as the Chief of the Forest Service deems desirable. Such  
practices shall be recognized as non-conforming uses of the area of 
wilderness involved and shall be terminated whenever this can be 
effected with equity to, or in agreement with, those making this use. 
(emphasis added)^®
The bill’s crafters dearly felt that motorized uses were not compatible 
with the wilderness character they sought to preserve. While maintaining 
the status quo where such uses were "well established", the bUl would phase 
out non-conforming uses in time. This would adjust the current status quo 
to be more in line with wUdemess values. The initial wording of this 
subsection is particularly telling when compared to the final version.
Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 49, at 6. 
60 Id. at 19.
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Opponents of the bill were not pleased with the fate the bill outlined 
for motorized uses. Gordon Rule, legal counsel for the National Association 
of Engine and Boat Manufacturers Inc. told the Senate Interior Committee 
that his organization saw section 3(c) as an "absolute prohibition" of new 
motorboat use in wilderness, and the next statement as a mandate to 
eliminate existing uses .^2 He argued that regulations for aircraft and 
motorboat use were already in place for Forest Service wilderness areas, and 
thus new regulations were not needed. Wilderness proponents appear to 
have responded to these complaints according to their original goal of 
minimizing opposition. Rather than risk alienating potential supporters, the 
drafters partially acquiesced on this point.
The 1958 version. Senate biU 4028, retained most of the same language 
regarding aircraft and motorboat use except for one crucial change. Section 
3(c), no longer contained the language terming motorboat and aircraft uses 
"non-conforming" uses that had to be eliminated. Additional change came 
with the following version, S. 1123, in 1959. Concerns of the timber industry 
and land management agencies prom pted the inclusion of language 
permitting the use of aircraft and other motorized transport for the control of 
fire, insects and the spread of disease in the forests. Under section 3(c)(1) after 
"deems desirable", the following was inserted;
Within national forest areas included in the WUdemess System such 
measures may be taken as may be necessary in the control of insects 
and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems 
desirable.^3
62 Id. at 276.
National Wilderness Preservation Act of 1959, Hearings on S. 1123 Before the Senate 
Committee on Interior and Insular AJfairs, 86ih Cong. IstSess.
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While the main substance of these sections remained essentially the same, 
the prohibitions had been reined in and the exceptions broadened to 
minimize conflicts.
Conclusion
Senator Anderson, Committee chairman sum marized his overview of 
the legislation's history saying that;
proponents were pretty well satisfied with the bill as drafted. They feel 
they have come a long way from their original position, but that they 
have given up  some things in the bill that they consider important to 
their purposes.*^
He stated that the opposition to the bUl; the Faim Bureau, lumbermen, oil 
people, mining interests and others, now realized that "wilderness is 
i n e v i t a b l e " . He continued to state that throughout the years of debate there 
had been "almost unanimous support for the basic purpose of a wilderness 
bill". The debate had been focused on disagreement regarding how much 
wilderness, how it should be designated and how stringent preservation 
would be. Anderson noted that considerable opposition had been w ithdraw n 
as a result of compromises by the proponents of the bill.66 Interior Secretary 
Udall saw S. 174 as a "reasonable compromise" on the part of all parties which 
"resolves many of the past objections'.67
A review of the legislative history behind the use of aircraft in 
wilderness indicates the attitude of wilderness proponents towards this use. 
While the original bill indicated the sponsors’ awareness that airfields and 
aircraft did not conform with wilderness, some level of use was permitted to
64 HESSION, supra note 27, at 1.
6 5  I d .
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 18.
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minimize opposition. Both the statutory language and statements of the 
bill's authors, indicate that aircraft use could be tolerated at existing levels, but 
would not be expanded. The original sponsors of the bill wanted this 
nonconforming use to be eliminated, however, compromise removed this 
explicit stipulation. The strongest statements by proponents of the bill focus 
on the values and character of the wilderness resource they were seeking to 
protect- This was clearly, in their minds, a wUdemess devoid of most of the 
impacts of man and his mechanical products. While the strategy of 
maintaining the status quo necessitated œm prom ising that character, the 
discretionary management power given to the agencies would allow them to 
minimize the conflicts between such uses and wilderness character.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER FOUR 
WILDERNESS AIRSTRIPS
Introduction
There are currently fifteen aircraft landing strips on national forest 
wildernesses in the coterminous states. These strips are found on the Frank 
Church-River of No Return Wilderness in Idaho, the Selway-Bitterroot 
WUdemess which straddles the Idaho-Montana border, and the Great Bear 
WUdemess in northem  Montana. This number does not include landing 
strips on either private or state wUdemess inholdings. This discussion 
excludes fixed-wing aircraft access to Alaskan wUdemesses which is permitted 
under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).i
The WUdemess Act of 1964 immediately designated 9.1 mUUon acres of 
Forest Service wUd, wUdemess, and canoe areas as units of the National 
WUdemess Preservation System. It set out provisions for determining the 
suitability of Forest Service Primitive areas for inclusion in the system within 
ten years, and for reviewing the wUdemess potential of aU large roadless areas 
w ithin the Department of Interior. The management provisions of the Act, 
however, only directly applied to the 54 units classified as wUderness in 1964. 
Those Primitive areas that were later included in the NWPS would also be 
managed under the 1964 Act. The Act left the door open for special 
management provisions for future wUdemesses.
As referred to in Chapter Three, one of the main reasons given for 
establishing a national wUdemess system was consistency of management. 
W idespread use of special provisions for post-1964 wildernesses would
t Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-487 § 1110,16 U.S.C. § 
3101 et seq..
50
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
undermine the consistency of wilderness in the NWPS.^ Perhaps seeing the 
error of this omission. Congress has applied the provisions of the original Act 
to subsequently designated wUdemesses, affirming that they would be 
managed in the same manner as the existing units. Wilderness enabling 
legislation usually includes a statem ent similar to the following excerpt from 
the Great Bear Wilderness Act,
The [designated wilderness] shall be administered by the Secretary [of 
Interior or Agriculture] in accordance with the provisions of the 
Wilderness Act governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness 
areas, except that any reference in  such provisions to the effective date 
of the Wüdemess Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective 
date of this Act.)
This practice did not preclude the use of special provisions, but restricted such 
exceptions to specific areas
Special management provisions occur in response to unique attributes 
or circumstances in an area, powerful special interests, or concem regarding 
ambiguities in the original WUdemess Act. The Eastem WUdemess Act 
responded to the concern that many potential wUdemesses in the east failed 
to meet the size and purity requirements of both the WUdemess Act and 
Forest Service policy. It was also a reaction to the fact that a high percentage 
of the remaining undeveloped lands in the East were privately owned and 
that opportunities for preserving public land were dwindling fast.) This act 
contains two unique clauses; (1) it gives the Secretary of Agriculture the 
power to condemn private land within wUdemess boundaries when 
landowners are not managing their property in a manner compatible with
2 JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT, at 119 (1990).
3 The Great Bear Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-546 § 3 ,16 U.S.C. 1132. 
 ̂HENDEE, supra note 2, at 119.
5 Id. at 134.
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wilderness values and (2) wilderness and wilderness study areas designated by 
this act were withdrawn from mineral entry
The Colorado Wilderness Act provides an example of the influence of 
special interest groups on wilderness legislation. Grazing is another 
nonconforming use which the Wilderness Act allowed to continue if 
previously established. As with aircraft landing strips and motorboat use, 
grazing was "subject to such reasonable regulations as are deemed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture"/ During the Forest Service's Roadless Area Review 
and Evaluation (RARE IE) process in the late 1970's, grazing permittees 
became increasingly concerned by the Forest Service’s use of its statutory 
discretion to limit wilderness grazing. Livestock operators feared that this 
administrative trend would eventually result in the phase out of grazing in 
designated wilderness.®
During deliberations over the Colorado Wilderness Act, Congress 
included language in the cornrnittee report. House Report 96-617, further 
protecting wüdemess grazing. The provision, which became known as the 
Colorado Grazing Guidelines’, stated that;
there shall be no curtailments of grazing in wilderness areas because an 
area is, or has been designated as wüdemess, nor should wüdemess 
designations be used as an excuse by administrators to slowly "phase 
out" grazing.^
The report stipulated that these guidelines would be "promptly, fuUy, and 
düigently im plem ented” by the Forest Service and applied to aU the agency’s 
wüdemess lands.^® WhÜe the provision explicitly explained that it did not
® Eastern Wilderness A ct, Pub. L. 93-622 (1974), 16 U.S.C. § 1132.
7 The WUdemess Act of 1964 Pub. L. No. 88-577 § 4(d)(4)(2) 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
® Frank R. Beum, Nonconforming Wilderness Uses: Confounding Issues and Challenges in 
PREPARING TO MANAGE WILDERNESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Proceedings of the 
conference, USDA Forest Service GTR SE-66 at 109 (1990).
9 H R. REP. NO. 96-617, (1979).
10 Id.
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amend the Wilderness Act, it was to guide Forest Service interpretation of the 
Act on all wilderness lands.i^
The Wilderness Act's language governing aircraft landings is also open 
to agency interpretation. The Act clearly gives the Secretary of Agriculture 
discretion to regulate this use in areas where it was previously established 
and prohibits it where absent prior to designation. The Selway-Bitterroot, the 
Frank Church, and the Great Bear WUdemesses had established aircraft usage 
before they were designated as wilderness. The Selway-Bitterroot was 
established by the 1964 Act and subject only to the provisions therein.
However, the Great Bear and Frank Church Wildernesses were not 
designated until 1978 and 1980 respectively. Proponents of air access in both 
these areas had a strong interest in limiting the Forest Service's discretion to 
eliminate aircraft use. This problem was dealt with differently for both areas, 
but with similar results. The Central Idaho Wilderness Act included 
statutory language further protecting air access to this area. The Great Bear 
Wilderness Act contained no such language in the law, but addressed the 
issue in the committee report. This report's language has become the basis 
for management of the single airstrip on the Great Bear.
The Central Idaho W ilderness Act
On July 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 ,  President Carter signed into law the Central Idaho 
Wilderness Act (CIWA), creating what was then the largest wilderness area in 
the lower 4 8  s t a t e s . ^ 2  xhis bUl designated 2 . 2  million acres of wilderness in 
central Idaho and added 105,600 acres to the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness in
Î 1 The Wilderness Act, supra note 7, § 1133.
12 The Central Idaho W üdemess Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312; 16 U.S.C. § 1132. The Death 
Valley Wilderness managed by the NFS in CA is now the largest wüdem ess in the coterminous 
states.
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Idaho. It also gave Wild and Scenic status to 125 miles of the Salmon River. 
Many users believed that an area of this size was too vast to permit reasonable 
access by foot. There was a substantial tradition of access by stock and 
airplane, both private and commercial. These users wished to ensure their 
continued access by these means.i^
Idaho’s senior Senator Frank Church, for whom the wüdemess would 
later be renamed, was the individual most responsible for the passage of this 
act.i^ In 1979 Senator Church introduced three bills into the Senate on behalf 
of the River of No Return WUdemess Council, a coalition of conservationist 
groups, the Idaho Forest Industry Coundl, and the Carter administration.
All three of these bills contained language dealing with aircraft and 
motorboat use that mirrored section 4(d)(1) of the WUdemess Act. Before the 
bUls went to committee. Church facilitated four days of hearings around 
Idaho, and a fifth day in Washington D C.. All told, testimony was heard 
from over 600 people.!^ By the time the bUl was reported out of committee, 
the provision governing aircraft had been rewritten to remove much of the 
Secretary’s discretionary authority to close wUdemess airstrips.
The altemate language included in the CIWA ensured the 
continuation of this preexisting use. The final language regarding aircraft use 
is found in section 7(a)(1);
the landing of aircraft, where this use has become established prior to 
the date of enactment of this Act shaU be permitted to continue subject 
to such restrictions as the Secretary deems desirable; Provided,
River of No Return Wilderness Proposals, 1979 Hearings on S. 95 , S. 96. and S. 97 Before the 
Subcomm. on Parks, Recreation and Renewable Resources of the Senate Comm, on Energy and 
Natural Resources, %th Cong. 1st Sess.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, Vol. 35, at 688 (1979). Originally 
designated the River of No Return Wilderness, it was renamed the Frank Church-River of No 
Return Wilderness in 1984 by Public Law 98-231.
1 5  I d .
See generally. River of No Return Wilderness Proposals, supra note 13.
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however, that the Secretary shall not permanently close or render 
unserviceable any aircraft landing strip in regular use on national 
forest lands on the date of enactment of the Act for reasons other than 
extreme danger to aircraft, and in any case not without the express 
written concurrence of the agency of the State of Idaho charged with 
evaluating the safety of backcountry airstrips.'^
The Forest Service has responded to this provision by retaining and
maintaining all of the twelve airstrips managed by the agency.
During the hearings in Idaho, there were some comments supporting
the exception allowing for established uses of aircraft and motorboats, yet only
four statements favored an additional statutory mandate to protect all
wilderness airstrips. People who spoke in favor of the continuation of
established uses, whether by air or by water, primarily kept their comments
within the framework of the existing language. The River of No Return
Council, which spoke for 39 organizations and submitted a petition signed by
20,178 individuals favoring S. 95, supported the continuation of established
aircraft and motorboat uses according to section 4(d)(1) of the Wilderness
A c t '8
Idaho Governor John Evans was one of a few witnesses who spoke in 
favor of stronger protection of air access. Evans asserted that he would insist 
"that all existing airstrips on public lands within the primitive area remain 
accessible to the public".'^ The editor of the Idaho Statesman also argued that 
the existing provision for aircraft use was not good enough. He felt the 
wording was not definitive enough and gave "too much discretionary power 
to the Secretary of Agriculture to capriciously and arbitrarily close landing 
strips" .̂ 0
The Central Idaho Wilderness Act, supra note 12, § 7(a)(1). 
River of No Return Wilderness Proposals, S M pra note 13, at 599. 
'9  Id. at 557.
20 Id. at 688.
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It was not until the hearing in Washington D C. that most of the 
discussion regarding increased protection of existing airstrips took place, 
primarily as a debate between Senator Church and representatives of the 
Department of Agriculture. Senator Church expounded that,
[the proposed Central Idaho wilderness] is not the kind of area that can 
be easily entered on foot from its exterior boundaries by people who 
have neither the time or the capability . . .  many people who want the 
wilderness experience fly in and land on one or another of these 
airstrips and then move to the interior of the area from the landing 
strip.21
Rupert Cutler, the Assistant Secretary for Conservation, Research, and 
Education at the Department of Agriculture, countered with the assurance 
that closure of back-country airstrips would only happen "after a fair amount 
of due process."22 He stated that the Department of Agriculture favored the 
discretionary authority provided by the Wüdemess Act which would allow 
airstrips on national forest land that "are not needed for the protection and 
appropriate use of the wüdemess or for emergency purposes. . .  [to] be phased 
out. "23
According to the Department, only a few of the twelve airstrips in 
question received active maintenance and some had been closed due to their 
dangerous conditions. Church admonished the Department and the Forest 
Service for these closures, stating that "through the process of intentional 
neglect over the passage of years, they have become virtuaUy unusable."24 He 
argued for "something in this bül that lays down an affirmative duty on the 
Forest Service [to maintain these strips] because access to this area is just too 
im portant. "2 5 Senator McClure also found the language of the Wüdemess
21 Id. at 871.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 872.
24 Id. at 881.
25 Id. at 872.
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Act too permissive and believed that it could result in management that did 
not meet "with the approval of the people who are accustomed to that u s e .  "26
This discussion reappeared once again on the House and Senate floors. 
Senator Church justitied the need for air access to his colleagues by saying that 
"[b]ecause of the vastness of the new wilderness, without continued access by 
air, few people could see and enjoy the more remote and less accessible parts 
of this region." He emphasized that "the Forest Service is expressly prohibited 
from closing airstrips on national forests within the wilderness, which are in 
regular use at present, except for the reason of aircraft safety."27 In the House, 
Representative Santini emphasized the need to provide explicit direction to 
the Forest Service because "there has been a very strong administration trend 
to either totally preclude such use or to make them essentially
unattainable."28
Section 7(a)(1) clearly limits administrative discretion to close 
wilderness airstrips on this Wilderness. However, nowhere in the statutory 
language or the legislative history is there any indication that Congress 
intended to limit the agency's ability to regulate levels of air access to these 
strips. Nor is there any discussion of increasing levels of use. So, while the 
Act and its history does not prohibit any increase in use beyond the level 
existing in 1980, neither does it prevent the Forest Service from restricting use 
to 1980 levels where necessary to meet the Wilderness Act's requirements for 
wilderness character, values and experience. The ClWA’s addition to the 
Wilderness Act's aircraft exception merely prohibits the closure of these 
airstrips for anything but safety reasons and mandates state involvement.
26 Id. at 881.
27126 CONG. REC. at S17780 (DaUy ed. June 26,1980). 
28 Id. at S17781.
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Wilderness managers on the Frank Church have interpreted it more 
restrictively than is necessary.
The Great Bear Wilderness Act
While the language of the three paragraph Great Bear Wilderness Act 
does not address the issue of aircraft landing strips, this issue is discussed in 
the report which accompanied the bill. The legislation, sponsored by 
Representative Mo UdaU (D-AZ), added 60,000 acres to the Bob Marshall 
Wilderness and designated approximately 290,571 acres of the Flathead 
National Forest as the Great Bear Wilderness. The newly designated Great 
Bear Wilderness contained one airstrip, Schafer Meadows, which was 
primarily used for recreational access by commercial outfitters and private 
users, as well as for administrative purposes.29
House Report 1616 states that *'[t]his area was included m the 
wilderness with the specific understanding that the Forest Service wül not act 
to phase out public use of the airstrip." It goes on to note that section 4(d)(1) 
of the Wilderness Act allows for such use to continue «md instructs the Forest 
Service to manage the area so as to provide for continued access to the 
airstrip."30 While the airstrip must remain open, the committee agreed that 
it should not be significantly upgraded in any way. It also recognized that the 
level of use should remain about the same and added that "greatly expanded 
use may be reasonably regulated by the Forest Service to protect wüdemess 
v a l u e s . T h i s  regulation might be anticipated to iiKlude limitations on 
daüy landings or types of usage.
29 The Great Bear Wilderness Act, supra note 3.
30 H.R. REP. 1616, at 3-4, (1978).
31 Id. at 4.
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As discussed in Chapter Two, a statute is the only legally permissible 
way for a legislature to express its will. Statements within the legislative 
history of an act may, however, be used to guide interpretation of a statute 
where it is vague, ambiguous, or over general. The Forest Service has taken 
the report’s language as a guide for management in this area. The agency 
states in the Bob Marshall Great Bear Scapegoat Wilderness Recreation 
Management Direction of 1987 that "the Forest Service recognizes the 
Congressional Direction established in the House Committee Report 
accompanying the act establishing the Great Bear W i ld e m e s s  ’.^z
Conclusion
The direction found in both the Central Idaho Wilderness Act and 
House Report 1616 indicate an unwillingness to allow the Forest Service full 
discretion for the management of airfields in wilderness. The main concem 
of the activists behind both of these provisions appears to be preventing 
unwarranted closure of landing strips. The language of the CIWA clearly 
restricts the Forest Service’s ability to dose airfields, however it places no 
restrictions on the agency's power to regulate or limit air access. Nor does the 
CIWA explicitly require the Forest Service to repair an airstrip that has been 
rendered unserviceable by natural causes. House Report 1616 emphasizes 
Congress' intention to keep the Shafer Meadows airstrip open. It does, 
however, dearly recognize the potential need to regulate air access in order to 
protect the wilderness resource.
Thus, although proponents of both provisions were wary of the 
regulatory discretion provided by the Wilderness Act, neither goes much
32 b o b  MARSHALL, GREAT BEAR, AND SCAPEGOAT WILDERNESSES: RECREATION 
MANAGEMENT DIRECTION, at 36 (1987).
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further than that statute in actuality. The emphasis of section 4(d)(1) of the 
Wilderness Act is on maintaining the status quo. For the Selway-Bitterroot, 
the status quo in 1964 included three airstrips with a moderate level of use. 
Therefore, Congressional intent was to retain this level of access - not to allow 
it to increase. While the statutory discretion would permit the Forest Service 
to decrease or eliminate these airstrips, that has not been done. What all 
three provisions do still allow, most importantly, is agency regulation of 
these airstrips, per its own regulations, for the protection of wilderness values 
and the wilderness experience.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WILDERNESS AIRSTRIPS TODAY
The Development of Forest Service Wilderness Policy
As explained in Chapter Two, it is the responsibility of the relevant 
federal agencies to translate Congressional statutes into working regulations 
that accurately interpret the legislature's intent. After the passage of the 
Wilderness Act, the Forest Service needed to write wilderness regulations 
that translated the goals and provisions of the Act into on-the-ground 
preservation.
In "Two faces of wilderness - a time for choice", BUl Worf detaUs the 
birth of wUdemess policy in the Forest Service.^ Worf played an important 
role in this development as a member of the four person task force assigned 
to draft the agency's wUdemess regulations and policy guidelines. The task 
force recognized that Congress had clearly instructed the agency to pursue a 
new direction in wilderness policy. To better understand that mandate, they 
first studied the legislative history and debate surrounding wUdemess 
legislation.2 Throughout this histoiy, wUdemess supporters consistently 
made three points: "1) the wUdemess resource is special, 2) the WUdemess 
System must be for all time, and 3) wUdemess once lost could never be 
regained. "̂  The job of the task force would have been simple if Congress had 
not included a list of exceptions to the generally prohibited uses of wUdemess. 
In doing this Congress "opened the door for controversy and 
inconsistencies in agency interpretation.
1 William A. Worf, Tioo faces of wilderness - a time for choice, 16 ID L REV 424,425 (1980).
2 Id. at 426.
3 Id. at 427.
4 Id.
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
In 1965, the wilderness task force sent out 18,000 copies of their draft 
wilderness regulations for public comment. Meanwhile, land managers were 
being barraged with requests for permission to use motorized equipment in 
wilderness; from miners asking for helicopter access to wüdemess mines, to 
phone companies wanting to build electronic repeaters in newly designated 
wUdemess. On a case-by-case basis, managers tested these decisions "against 
the Act, the maturing policy, and other preceding decisions."^
To meet such challenges, the agency needed a clear management 
phUosophy. This phUosophy had to be based on a full understanding of the 
value and meaning of wüdemess, and an interpretation of the statutory 
language regarding management activities "necessary to meet the minimum 
requirements of the administration of the area for the purposes of this Act."^ 
Whüe an overarching phUosophy would provide consistency, it was clear 
that there would need to be flexibility in on-the-ground decision making.
Worf summarized this phUosophy as follows:
WUdemess is recognized as . . .  a fragUe and essentiaUy nonrenewable 
resource. Man's use of the area must always be in context with the idea 
that maintaining an enduring resource of wUdemess for the future is 
our overriding mandate.^
This doctrine came to be known as the Forest Service's purity phUosophy.
Under the purity phUosophy, the appropriateness of nonconforming
activities would be judged by their feasibility. The feasibility of undertaking a
project through primitive rather than motorized or mechanized means
would not be biased by economic considerations, convenience, comfort, of
efficiency.® This applied to administrative, public, and commercial activities
5 Id.
6 Id. at 427 and The WUdemess Act Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. §1131(c).
7 Id. at 427.
8 Id. at 428.
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alike. This philosophy interprets the prohibitions of the Wilderness Act’s 
section 4(c) as being aimed as much
at preventing the ease and efficiency with which man can affect the 
character of the land as to prevent temporary noise or unnatural 
appearance . . . .  The cumulative effect of nonconforming occupancies 
and mechanization is sometimes subtle, but nonetheless rea l . . . .  the 
fact that they can sometimes be hidden from visitors . . .  does not make 
them more compatible with wilderness.^
The purity doctrine has been criticized both by Congress and by some 
classes of wilderness users. Senator Church, during debate over the 
Endangered American Wilderness Act in 1977, accused the agency of 
"applying provisions of the Wilderness Act too strictly '.^o Yet the task force 
had considered both a more liberal interpretation of the Act’s meaning of 
wilderness and the "necessary . . . minimum requirements" provision and 
had rejected both in light of the Act’s intent.ii While a more practical 
approach to wilderness management might reduce opposition to new 
wüdemess designation^^ and fadlitate higher use of the NWPS, the 
wüdemess resource as envisioned by the Wüdemess Act's sponsors would be 
irreversibly damaged. In conclusion, Worf chaUenged the growing debate 
over the appropriateness of the purity doctrine to consider "whether we want 
a carefuUy selected and cherished coUection of U.S. originals in our 
wüdemess heritage gaUery or whether we want to fül it to overflow with 
cheap copies."i3
Forest Service W üdemess Regulations and Policy 
Current Forest Service wüdemess regulations and policy are found in 
the Code of Federal Regulations and the Forest Service Manual. For the
9 Id. at 430.
10 Id. at 432.
11 Id. at 433.
12 Id. at 436.
13 Id. at 437.
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purpose of this thesis, I will focus only on regulations that broadly and 
specifically speak to nonconforming wUdemess uses. The Forest Service 
WUdemess Regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations state that 
National Forest WUdemess shall be managed "to promote, perpetuate, and, 
where necessary, restore the wUdemess character of the land and its specific 
values of solitude, physical and mental chaUenge, scientific study, and
primitive recreation.
C.F.R. section 293.6 reiterates the WUdemess Act's stipulation that 
nonconforming motorized uses are prohibited "[ejxcept as provided in the 
WUdemess Act, subsequent legislation establishing a particular WUdemess 
unit or . . .  [other regulations], and subject to existing rights".^5 These 
regulations further outline the discretion of Chief of Forest Service to 
regulate certain of these uses;
The Chief, Forest Service, may permit, subject to such restrictions as he 
deems desirable, the landing of aircraft and the use of motorboats at 
places within any wUdemess where these uses were established prior to 
the date the WUdemess was designated by Congress.. . .  The Chief may 
also permit the maintenance of aircraft landing strips, heliports, or 
hehspots which existed when the Wilderness was designated.!^
In recognition of the potential ambiguity within the Act, these regulations tell
the agency that when it is "resolving conflicts in resource use, wUdemess
values wUl be dominant". This is qualified by the clause, ". . .  to the extent
not limited by the WUdemess Act, subsequent establishing legislation, or the
regulations in this part."!^
The Forest Service Manual provides guidance to the agency in both
broad and detaUed directives. Unlike the codified regulations in the C.F.R.s,
64
!4 36 C.F.R § 293.2.
!5 36 C.F.R.§ 293.6.
16 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(c).
17 36 C.F.R. § 293.2(c).
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the Forest Service Manual is a policy document rather than a set of strict 
regulations. Several recent court cases have asserted that the policy direction 
found in the Forest Service Manual is not legally binding on the agency.
The Forest Service Manual is not substantive but "merely establishes 
guidelines for the exercise of the Service's prosecutorial discretion”.!^
Because the Manual is not promulgated according to specific Congressional 
direction as the CFR regulations are, it does not "have the independent force 
and effect of law" according to the court in Western Radio Services Co,, Inc. v. 
Espy. 20 Despite this ruling, the agency can stUl be found to have been 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act if it does 
not follow the policies it sets forth for itself in the Manual. It is also the 
source for consistent management direction across the agency and is where 
managers turn when faced with difficult discretionary duties. Therefore, it is 
still quite important to this discussion.
The Forest Service Manual instructs wilderness managers to;
Manage the wüdemess resource to ensure its character and values are 
dominant and enduring. Its management must be consistent over 
time and between areas to ensure its present and future avaüability and 
enjoyment as wüdemess. . . . ensure that each wüdemess offers 
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined 
type of recreation.2!
It sets forth a general "policy" for the management of nonconforming uses of
wüdemess areas that states;
In wüdemesses where the establishing legislation permits resource 
uses and activities that are nonconforming exceptions to the definition
United States v. D»rem«s, 888 F. 2d 630,633 (9th Cir. 1989);lV«fem Radio Services Co., Inc.
V. Espy, 79 F. 3d 896,901 (9th Cir. 1996);Swanson v. U.S. Forest Service, 87 F. 3d 339 (9th Cir.
1996).
United States v. Doremus, 888 F. 2d 630,633 (9th Cir. 1989) cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1046, 111 S. 
Ct. 751,752,112 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1991).
20 Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F 3d 896,901 (9th Cir. 1996).
21 FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, WO Arndt § 2320 at 6 (1990).
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of wilderness as described in the Wilderness Act, manage these 
nonconforming uses and activities in such a manner as to minimize 
their effect on the wilderness resource
In addition to following these general policy guidelines, managers should;
Cease uses and activities and remove existing structures not essential 
to the administration, protection, or management of wilderness for 
wilderness purposes or not provided for in the establishing 
legislation.23
The guidelines set forth in the Forest Service Manual become more 
important for occurrences like airfields, where Congress has given the agency 
discretion rather than strict direction. However, even with the clarification of 
the Manual and Regulations, on-the-ground decisions are still subject to a 
large amount of discretion and, as a result, controversy. I will now look more 
closely at existing airstrips in Idaho and Montana and then examine some 
current issues in Forest Service wüdemess airfield management and how the 
interpretive framework I have presented can assist managers in their 
decision-making processes.
Wilderness Airstrips in Idaho and Montana
Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness 
The 2.3 mUlion acre Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness 
(FC-RONRW) has 31 operational airstrips within its boundaries Twelve of 
these are on federal land (Table 1.), four are on state inholdings, and fifteen 
are on private inholdings.^s Additional airstrips occur on national forest 
lands just outside the Wilderness.26 According to the Wüdemess
22 Id. § 2320.3(3) at 8.
23 Id. § 2320.3(4) at 8.
Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness Draft Env. Impact Statement (FC-RONRW 
DEIS) , Vol. I, at 3-6 (1998).
25 Id. at 1-9, 3-6.
26 FC-RONRW Draft Programmatic Management Plan, at 13 (1998).
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Management Plaiv these airstrips "provide improved access to the 
Wilderness for hunters^ anglers, backpackers, river floaters, researchers, 
private inholding groups, and other wilderness users."^^ As described in 
Chapter Four, the Central Idaho Wilderness Act (CIWA) contains a special 
provision governing the closure of airstrips on federal land in the 
Wilderness. Both the provisions of the CIWA and the Wilderness Act must 
be considered in wilderness management decisions in this area.
Table 1. Operational Landing Strips in the F C - R O N R W .^ s
National Forest Land
Bernard*
Cabin Creek*A 
Chamberlain* A 
Cold Meadows*A 
Dewey Moore 0  
Indian Creek* 
Mahoney* A 
Mile-Hi 0  
Simonds 0  
Soldier Bar* 
Vines 0  
Wilson Bar
State Inholdings Private Inholdings
Lower Loon Creek 
Stonebraker* 
Taylor Ranch* 
Thomas Creek
Allison Ranch 
Bradley Ranch 
Campbells Ferry 
Copenhaven 
Dovel 
Flying B 
James Ranch 
Pistol Creek 
Root Ranch 
Shepp Ranch 
Sulphur Creek Ranch 
Whitewater Ranch 
YeUowpine Bar
* Closed to public use but operational.
* National forest landing strip with pit toilets.29 
A National forest landing strip with stock racks.^o
0  National forest landing strip under consideration for use limitations by the 
DEIS; œmmercial use currently prohibited.
The recently released 1998D raft Environmental Impact Statement 
(DEIS) for the FC-RONRW notes that ”[t]he sites and sounds of aircraft 
operating at or near landing strips and the noise of low level overflights
27 FC-RONRW, supra note 24, at 1-36.
28 FC-RONRW, supra note 26, at 11.
29 Id. 13.
30 Id.
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probably disturb the quiet of the wilderness. The presence of aircraft and 
landing strips affect wilderness visitors' potential for "viewing undeveloped 
landscapes and areas where natural forces predominate They provide a 
"reminder of human presence in the w ild e m e s s ." 3 3  in addition to affecting 
non-motorized users, "[a]ircraft activities have the potential to affect wildlife 
. species, particularly those at landing sites located on or near key wildlife 
habitat."34 Some landing strips have been identified as being proximal to 
important habitat areas such as elk calving grounds.^s
The landing strips vary in  condition from small, non-maintained, 
undeveloped areas to graded and maintained runways with tie-downs, wind 
socks, and user fadlities.36 Most have only been given a "fair" condition 
rating by the state of Idaho’s last inspection.37 According to the FC-RONRW 
management plan, approximately 5,500 aircraft landings occur within the 
wilderness annually. Chamberlain and Indian Creek are the least demanding 
to land on. Much of the use of Indian Creek is by boaters accessing the Middle 
Fork of the Salmon River.3® Data on the use of federal airstrips in the 
Wilderness is limited and inconsistent. Information that was collected 
between 1991 and 1995, however, provides an idea of general trends and 
minimum levels of use.^^ During this period use has fluctuated but has not 
increased measurably
31 Id.
32 FC-RONRW, supra note 24, at 1-32.
33 Id. at 1-37.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1-9.
36 Id. at 1-37.
37 Id. at 1-10.
33 FC-RONRW, supra note 26, at 13.
39 Id. at 14.
40 Id. at 15.
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Selwav-Bitterroot Wilderness 
The Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness covers 1,340,460 acres straddling the 
Montana-Idaho border The area was one of the original Forest Service 
wilderness units designated by the 1964 Act. At that time there were three 
established airstrips in this area that are still in use today; Moose Creek,
Shearer, and Fish Lake. Both Moose Creek and Shearer are situated along the 
Selway River in the heart of the wilderness on the Nez Perce National Forest 
and Fish Lake is near the Wilderness' northem border on the Clearwater 
National Forest.
Moose Creek is the only airfield on the Selway Bitterroot for which 
there is reliable use data. This data indicates that total landings at this strip 
have remained stable since 1975, decreasing slightly in recent years.^z Use of 
all three airstrips fits into three categories, administrative (either district use, 
fire, emergency of other agency activities), private, and o u t f i t t e d . ^ ^  Between 
1975 and 1990, use of the Moose Creek airstrip was 11% administrative, 35% 
outfitted, and 54% private. Over this period, administrative use has declined 
substantially as the agency has eliminated its dependence on air access for 
supplying the Moose Creek Ranger Station. Commercial flights were reduced 
by a third when the number of outfitters operating there dropped from three 
to two.^4 In 1996, there were a total of 565 landings recorded at Moose Creek, 
with 86% of these private, 10% commercial, and the remainder 
administrative flights of different types.^s
Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute, Unpublished data (1998).
2̂ u.S.D.A. Forest Service, Sdway-Bifterroof Wilderness General Management Direction , at 
0-1 (1992).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 0-2.
45 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness 1996 State of the Wilderness Report, 
at 23 (1996).
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The management plan states that "low level overflights by aircraft 
create a disturbance which is not compatible w ith a wilderness experience. "46 
Despite this fact, these airstrips are intended to serve as "internal portals for 
users pursuing wilderness-dependent activities' .̂  ̂ In 1988, research at the 
Shearer airstrip found that most aircraft remained at the strip for less than 15 
minutes which, according to the Forest Service, is not a wilderness-dependent 
use unless the pilots were dropping off wüdemess users.48 Instead, many 
pilots are engaged in what are called "touch and goes", where an aircraft 
touches down on a strip in order to add another backcountry landing to their 
accomplishments .49
The 1992 Management Plan Update addresses how the use of these 
three airfields will be evaluated and possibly regulated. The number of 
landings per day per airfield, and the number of landings per year per airfield 
wUl serve as indicators of use levels. Standards that will be based upon four 
years of "reasonable data" from each landing strip and a study of user 
perceptions regarding aircraft use and impacts will allow mangers to judge 
inappropriate use of the airstrips.^o Six years after the plan was written, four 
years of data is still needed for Fish Lake and three years for Shearer.51 A 
yearly standard of 800 landings was set for Moose Greek based on the avéfage 
number of landings from 1975 to 1990. There is still no daily standard for 
Moose Creek and no standards at all for Fish Lake and S h e a r e r . 5 2
46 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, supra note 42, at 0-1.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 0-2.
49por definition of "touch and go" landings see U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Payette NF, 
Environmental Assessment for the Cabin Creek Airstrip Repair Project, March 31,1997 at 34.
88 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, supra note 42, at 0-1 .
81 Jerome Bird, District Ranger, U.S.D.A. Forest Service Moose Creek Ranger District, personal 
communication, 3/18/97.
82 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, supra note 42, at 0-2.
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The purpose of these standards is to allow managers to prevent 
"further erosion of wilderness values, such as that of an area isolated from 
the sights and sounds of human use."53 While no standards will be set for 
length of stay at the airfields, management restrictions may be imposed when 
total use numbers exceed standards in order to reduce use that is not 
wilderness dependent.®^ The management plan prioritizes management 
methods that might be instituted in the face of overuse. The two "most 
preferable" methods are education (through airport guides, newsletters, and 
on-site contacts and interpretative materials) and encouraging use of airstrips 
outside of the wilderness boundary. Three other techniques are listed as 
"least preferable but still acceptable". These are requiring user landing fees, 
instituting a permit system, and emphasizing shuttle services rather than 
many smaller aircraft.55
The 1992 plan's attem pt to reevaluate levels of air access to the Selway- 
Bitterroot is admirable but unfortunately it has not been implemented.
While outfitter use of Moose Creek has decreased, private use has increased.
If the inactive outfitter permit is reissued. Moose Creek could be in danger of 
violating its standards. Use data is not yet available for the Shearer and Fish 
Lake airfields because of insufficient funds to support a study. The forests are 
trying to find volunteers to collect this data since automatic counters are 
consistently disabled by moose. To be reliable however, data would need to be 
collected throughout the full operating season which is July through October 
for the high altitude Fish Lake, and June through October for Shearer and 
Moose Creek.56
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 0 6 .
55 Bird, supra note 51.
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Great Bear Wilderness 
The Great Bear Wilderness is part of the area commonly called the Bob 
Marshall Wilderness Complex (BMWC) along the Continental Divide in 
northern Montana. As discussed in Chapter Four, when the Great Bear 
Wilderness was designated, the House Committee Report included a 
statement of their intent to allow use of the Shafer Meadows Airstrip to 
continue. The report stipulated that the airfield should remain open, but that 
access could be regulated if use expanded g r e a t l y .5 7  The 1 9 8 7  Recreation 
Management Direction for the BMWC officially recognized the Congressional 
direction given by this report.
The task force responsible for writing the management plan, which 
was made up of mangers, researchers, and c i t i z e n s ^ s  and included pilots, 
chose not to define "greatly expanded use".59 Instead, the acceptable level of 
aircraft use would be based on impacts to the wüdemess resource and 
experience. Management actions would be imposed only if use levels 
exceeded standards set by the Task Force.̂ ® As on the Selway Bitterroot, 
airfield use indicators are the number of landings per day and per year. The 
standards for appropriate use levels are 1) "[a] 90% probability of having no 
more than a total of five aircraft landings per day" and 2) "[n]o more than a 
total of 550 landings per year of which no more than 6% will be 
adm inistrative landings.
The task force emphasized the need for education of both pÜots and 
non-motorized users before use gets to the point where it is unacceptably
57 H. REP. No. 96-1616 (1978).
5® U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Bob Marshall, Great Bear, Scapegoat Wildernesses: Recreation 
Management Direction, at 58 (1987).
59 Id. at 36.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 39.
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impacting other wilderness users. Educational programs include a 
cooperative effort between the Forest Service, the Montana Aeronautics 
Division, Montana Pilots Association, and others to instruct pilots to avoid 
flights into Schafer for non-wildemess purposes, to maintain a minimum 
flight level of 2,000 feet over the wilderness, and to avoid unnecessary low 
approaches and d e p a r t u r e s . ^ ^  Training flights into the wilderness strip have 
been discouraged by both the pilot associations and the Forest S e r v i c e . ^ 3  por 
its part, the Forest Service will let other wilderness users know about these 
efforte and tell them that air access is a Congressionally recognized use of the 
Great Bear Wildemess.^^
If the standards are e>jceeded and increased educational efforts cannot 
bring them back into compliance, more restrictive management steps wül be 
taken. These might entail limiting the types and timing of landings, or as a 
last resort, requiring a perm it for landings. Of the various options, the least 
restrictive management tool will always be c h o s e n . ^ ^  The Forest has between 
twelve and fifteen year of use data for the Shafer Meadows strip. This 
information is broken down by type of user, but it is not statistically accurate 
at this level. Use levels are currently within the parameters of the standards. 
There is an administrative site at the airfield which gives managers the 
opportunity to make contact w ith users and further educational efforts 
towards both aircraft and non-motorized users.**
*2 Id.
*3 Steve McCoot personal communication, 4/24/98.
*4 Id. at 39-40.
*5 Id. at 40.
** Gordon Ash, Spotted Bear Ranger District, personal communication, 4 /9 /97 .
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Issues in Airstrip Management and Congressional Intent
Applying the Process 
I will now examine three recent issues in wilderness airfield 
management and demonstrate how the interpretive framework outlined in 
Chapter Two can be applied to them. In one of these case studies, wilderness 
values prevailed; one gave preference to aircraft access; and one is undecided.
In each of these cases I will show how the steps of statutory construction and 
legislative interpretation outUned in Chapter Two and dem onstrated in 
Chapters Three and Four could have been applied. The primary steps that 
must be followed are as follows; 1) determine through statutory construction 
whether ambiguity exists, 2) apply the canons of linguistic construction to the 
statute to attempt to resolve the ambiguity or contradiction, 3) after statutory 
construction fails, determine whether the use of legislative history is 
appropriate, 4) examine the legislative history for Congressional intent.
FC-RONRW Management Plan 
The first case study I will look at is the Draft Management Plan for the 
FC-RONRW. This is an example of a decision which was not properly 
informed by the intentions of the Wilderness Act and the CIWA. One of the 
primary focuses of the 1998 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) 
accompanying the new management plan is the acceptability of aircraft use 
and maintenance of landing strips in the W i l d e m e s s . * ^  The DEIS will decide 
how much commercial aircraft access is acceptable, what degree of 
maintenance should be undertaken, and how to reduce conflicts between 
aircraft and other users.^® The need for this analysis was brought up by 
conflicts with other user groups identified by managers and the public.^^ It is
^^FC-RONRW, supra note 24, at 1-6.
68 Id. at 1-7.
69 Id. at 1-9.
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an im portant case study because the chosen alternative will govern 
management of all twelve airstrips for the next planning period.
Common factors for all four action alternatives in the DEIS include 
requiring special use permits for aU commercial flights, minimum tool 
evaluations for any maintenance projects, seasonal closures to prevent soil 
erosion and wildlife disturbances, and case- by-case analysis of the treatment 
of acquired lands with air access.70 Alternative 5, the Forest Service's 
preferred alternative, prohibits commercial use of Dewey-Moore, Mile-Hi, 
Simonds, and Vines airstrips (see Table 1.), limits non-commercial use on 
these strips to emergency situations only, and would maintain them at only a 
serviceable rating or b e t t e r T h e  remaining eight strips would be 
maintained at a fair rating.
The planning document anticipates an increase in overall airstrip use 
based on projections of growth for the state of Idaho. Under Alternative 5, 
this increase would be concentrated primarily at Indian Creek and 
Chamberlain.^^ Use at Cabin Creek is expected to see the next highest level of 
increase. Overall, the Wilderness would see a slow increase in overflights 
that might be offset by educational efforts geared at backcountry pilots. ̂ 3
According to the DEIS, Alternative 2, would "have the greatest positive 
effect on the wilderness resource and would minimize the negative effects of 
aviation on other g r o u p s " . ^ ^  n  would also have the most negative effect on 
aviation activities, while still providing for "current use levels at most 
landing strips".^® This alternative would limit use of the four airstrips along
70 Id. at 2-105.
71 Id. at 2-106.
72 Id. at 4-4.
73 Id. at 4-4, 4-8.
74 Id. at 4-5.
75 Id.
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Big Creek to one party a week selected by permit and would reduce 
commercial use of Indian Creek to .44% of current peak levels/^ Use of non- 
wildemess airstrips would probably see the greatest increase under this 
alternative. Since more than half of the airstrips within the wilderness are 
privately owned, there is no way of assuring the reduction of overflights 
across the Wilderness solely through agency action. Now I will show how to 
apply the analytical framework to this case study.
Determine Ambiguity
The first step is to determine w hether the statutory issue is ambiguous 
and in need of interpretation. The FC-RONRW is governed by both the 
Wüdemess Act and the Central Idaho W üdemess Act (CIWA), thus both 
statutes m ust be examined. Construction ^ d  interpretation is only valid 
where the plain language of a statute is insufficient to resolve the issue or 
question. The interpreter must first apply the plain meaning doctrine to the 
statutory language of the relevant laws. The initial ambiguity in this case 
stems from provisions of the W üdemess Act that are intended to govern the 
entire NWPS. The analysis in Chapter Three has shown how aircraft use 
conflicts w ith the Act's definition of wüdemess. The conflict within the 
statute, and therefore the ambiguity, arises from the exception found in 
section 4(d)(1), which permits the continuation of a use that is incompatible 
with the wüdemess values and character defined in section 2 of the A ct The 
CIWA adds an additional level of ambiguity by increasing statutory protection 
for these airstrips without resolving the underlying conflict between the use 
and wüdemess protection.
76 Id. at 2-105.
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Canons of Linguistic Construction
The canons of linguistic construction do not help clarify the basic 
contradiction between the definition of wilderness and the exception for 
aircraft. However, they do shed light on the parameters of the management 
restrictions of section 7(a)(1) of the CIWA.^^ The Forest Service has 
interpreted this section of the CIWA as severely limiting their ability to 
restrict use of wilderness airstrips on the FC-RONRW. However, applying 
both the canons and examining the legislative history show that this section 
does not restrict their discretion to limit use levels. The canon of Expressio 
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius states that "the mention of one thing implies the 
exclusion of another". By adding an additional clause to the Wilderness Act's 
language in section 7(a)(1), Congress was clearly limiting the agency's ability 
to close airstrips on the Frank Church. With this provision. Congress showed 
that it could specifically limit the agency's management discretion. At the 
same time. Congress specifically does not limit the agency's ability to restrict 
itôe levels as it "deems desirable". By expressly restricting closures and not 
restricting regulation of use. Congress implies that only the ability to dose 
airstrips is limited.
. Legislative Interpretation
While the canons support this interpretation of the CIWA, they are not 
as widely accepted as legislative interpretation. Legislative interpretation is 
also still necessary to address the ambiguity in the Wüdemess Act. EspedaUy
§ 7(a)(1) of the CIWA states that, "the landing of aircraft, where this use has become 
established prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be permitted to continue subject to 
such restrictions as the Secretary deems desirable: Provided, however, that the Secretary 
shall not permanently close or render unserviceable any aircraft landing strip in regular use on 
national forest lands on the date of enactment of the Act for reasons other than extreme danger 
to aircraft, and in any case not without the express written concurrence of the agency of the 
State of Idaho charged with evaluating the safety of backcountry airstrips." The Central 
Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312; 16 U.S.C § 1132.
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in a case w ith strong special interest lobbying, it is important to research every 
relevant perspective. Therefore, the interpreter should then turn to the 
legislative history of the statute. As outlined in Chapter Two (Table 1), Justice 
Breyer lists five circumstances under which the use of legislative history is 
justified. In this case (1), avoiding an absurd result. Interpreting the 
Wilderness Act as allowing greatly expanded use of existing airstrips would 
create the absurd result of allowing high levels of a use that Congress 
perceives as incompatible with wüdemess values.
Turning to the legislative history, the first place to look for statutory 
explanations are the committee reports. The language of the committee 
report is given the most weight during interpretation. Statements made by 
the committee chair when he/she reports the bill out of committee and 
statements of the measure's sponsors are considered next. There are four 
committee reports relevant to the Wüdemess Act.^8 The full debate over 
wüdemess preservation, however, spanned nine years, 65 bills, and 18 
hearings. Therefore, there are important issues not mentioned in the 
committee reports which are addressed elsewhere.^^ All of these documents - 
the committee reports, debate published in the Congressional Record, 
statements by the sponsors in hearings, statements by the opposition, and aU 
the drafts of previous wüdemess bills - must then be examined to determine 
Congressional intent for the management of wüdemess airstrips.
Chapter Three gives a thorough description of relevant statements on 
these subjects. In summary, I found many clear definitions of wüdemess by 
the bÜls' sponsors. These definitions focused on solitude, natural processes.
78 s. REP. No. 635 (1961); S. REP. No. 109 (1963); H. REP. No. 1538 (1964); H. REP. No. 1829 
(1964).
79 Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964 : Its Background and Meaning., 45 OR. L. 
REV. at 298 (1966).
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and an absence of technology and human interference. To explain the 
continuation of preexisting airstrips, I looked at the treatm ent of airstrips in 
previous drafts of wilderness bills and the discussion of the status quo 
strategy. In the original wilderness bills, nonconforming uses like airfields 
were to be phased out when feasible (see page 45). This termination clause 
was eliminated in later drafts, but according to Sutherlands and others, both 
its earlier presence and eventual elimination are relevant to this discussion.®® 
By eliminating the phase out provision. Congress indicated its unwillingness 
to disrupt the status quo if it meant jeopardizing passage of a wilderness bill.
According to the legislative history of the Wilderness Act, the primary 
reason airstrips were allowed to persist in wüdemess despite their 
incompatibility, was to maintain the status quo and reduce opposition from 
displaced users. WhÜe existing uses would be allowed to continue, 
nonconforming uses were prohibited where they were absent prior to 
designation. Although Congress abdicated its right to statutorüy terminate 
the use of wüdemess airstrips in this Act, it in no way indicated an acceptance 
of increasing this use. Nor did the Wüdemess Act statutorily preclude the 
eventual elimination of wüdemess airstrips. Instead, Congress explicitly gave 
the managing agency, the Forest Service, the discretion to regulate use of 
these airfields as the agency "deems desirable".®^
On the other hand, whüe the CIWA does restrict the Forest Service’s 
ability to close airstrips, but does not reduce the Forest Service’s management 
discretion. The Forest Service is still bound by the Wüdemess Act to 
minimize the impacts of air access on the wüdemess character of an area.
The CIWA in no way impinges on the Service’s power to regulate levels of
80 SUTHERLAND STAY. CONST. § 48.04 (5th Ed.). 
®1 The Wilderness Act, supra note 6, § 4(d)(1).
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air access. The later act could have resolved the issue of management 
discretion, yet it did not. In the Great Bear House Report in 1978, the 
committee referred to agency regulation of "greatly expanded" aircraft use.
With that report. Congress demonstrated that it could be more specific and 
that it could, if it so desired, control the degree of agency management 
discretion of nonconforming uses.
The legislative history of the CIWA supports the conclusion that 
closure, not management discretion, was the evil being remedied. This 
history shows that the bills' sponsors wanted to prevent the agency from 
arbitrarily closing airstrips. Nowhere in any of the statutes' extrinsic 
documents is there an indication that Congress intended to reduce the Forest 
Service’s discretionary ability to manage use levels pursuant to agency 
regulations and policies. Senator Church did refer to the administrative 
trend of making air access "essentially unattainable."®2 This could be 
considered the outer limit to agency management discretion before the 
threshold of outright closure is reached.
Both the Wüdemess Act and the CIWA should have directed the 
agency to choose Alternative 2. Section 4(b) of the Act states that the 
administering agencies are responsible for "preserving the wüdemess 
character of the a r e a " .® ^  This character is defined in section 2 as "retaining its 
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or 
hum an habitation".®^ Yet, even though the DEIS admits that Alternative 2 
would have the most positive effect on wüdemess and other user groups, it 
was not selected. Simply overriding the broader mandates of the Wüdemess 
Act regarding the protection of wüdemess because of the protective clause of
®2 126 CONG. REC at S17781 (Daily ed. June 26,1980).
®3 The Wilderness Act, supra note 6, § 4(b) 16 U.S.C. § 1131. 
84 Id. § 2(c) 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
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the CIWA would be an absurd interpretation of the two acts. While 
alternative 2 would admittedly have the "most negative effect' ̂ s on aircraft 
users, it does not close any existing airstrips and therefore does not violate the 
CIWA. With a better understanding of the intent of the Wilderness Act and 
the CIWA the agency may have been prompted to select the alternative more 
in Une with Congressional intent.
Expansion of Helicopter Access in Alaska
I followed the same steps when examining the next two management 
issues. Much of the process is the same and I will not repeat it in detail. 
Specifically, the analyses rely upon the same statements of overall 
Congressional intent from the Wilderness Act. For these two examples I will 
emphasize the differences and not reiterate the similarities. The first of these 
is im portant because it would have set a precedent for permitting a 
supposedly established use to continue after a lapse of eighteen years since 
wüdemess designation. This is a case where the final decision followed the 
intent of the W üdemess Act.
In April of 19%, the U.S. Forest Service released a Draft EIS (DEIS), 
Helicopter Landings in Wilderness, which outlined seven alternatives 
providing for helicopter access to wüdemess within the Tongass National 
Forest. The range of alternatives would affect up to 12 out of the 19 
wüdemesses within the Tongass, and analyzes 135 access areas ranging in size 
from several acres to 12,000 acres. According to the DEIS, the need for this 
action "responds to the request to reinstate helicopter landings at over 400 
areas identified as used for general public access prior to designation".®^ It 
focused on providing the general public with easier access to remote Alaskan
FC-RONRW, supra note 24, at 4-5.
U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Helicopter Landings in Wilderness (DEIS), 1-3 (1996).
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wüdemess sites. The Proposed Action would have designated 41 helicopter 
access areas within seven wilderness areas, with one to twenty-five access 
areas in each affected wilderness. The number of landings at each area would 
be limited to five or twenty-five per year based on historical data. All of the 
action alternatives address only areas which have had previous usage by 
helicopters, as attested by pilots affidavits.
The DEIS relied on the W üdemess Act's "established" use clause as the 
legal basis for this action. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act (ANÏLCA) of 1980 includes specific provisions allowing for motorized 
access to Alaskan wüdemess to protect traditional subsistence uses of these 
areas. Section 1110 of ANILCA permits the use of fixed-wing aircraft, 
snowmobUes, and motorboats for subsistence hunting and gathering.®^
Because ANILCA specifies fixed-wing aircraft, the agency did not believe that 
this law provided sufficient legal basis for helicopter access. Therefore the 
DEIS focused on the special provisions of the Wüdemess Act.
The Forest Service relied on affidavits signed by helicopter püots 
stating that they had previously flown into specific areas as the basis for 
establishing previous use. One issue raised by the public during the NEPA 
scoping process was that this evidence is not independently verifiable and is 
based on the statements of those who stand to gain the most from the 
proposed action. No other forms of documentation, such as flight logs, dated 
photographs etc., were avaÜable.®® In its analysis, the Forest Service 
considered three visits within five years an "established" use.89 The fact that 
ANILCA does not refer to helicopter use whüe it does specify many other
ANILCA, supra note I, § 1110.
88 DEIS, supra note 86, at 1-15.
89 Id.
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uses, is to some critics . .  demonstrable evidence that helicopter use for 
recreation had not become established at the time of designation.''^^
This proposal caused an outcry of protest from wilderness users, the 
conservation community, the national office of the Forest Service, and the 
Department of the Interior. Arguments focused on the n ^a tiv e  impacts to 
the wilderness resource, the experience of solitude, and opportunities for 
primitive recreation. Commenters also criticized the agency's dependence on 
minimal levels of questionably proven past access to establish previous use 
history. There was a fear that this action would set a precedent for 
retroactively instating air access to other wilderness areas, including 
Department of Interior wildernesses. In November of 1997, the Alaskan 
Regional Forester Phil Janik issued the Record of Decision on this project, 
selecting the no action alternative that prohibited helicopter access to these 
wildernesses. Janik explained that the Selected Alternative;
provides for the best management of the Wüdemess resource to 
ensure its character and values are dominant and enduring within the 
framework of the existing laws, regulations, policies, public needs and 
desires, and capabilities of the land.^^
He found that there is currently adequate access to wüdemess without
permitting helicopter use. The impacts associated with helicopter access
outweighed the benefits this access might confer.
This decision shows how the agency can use both the intent and
statutory language of the Wüdemess Act to reject a nonconforming use that
would negatively affect the character of the wüdemess resource and
experience. Whüe the agency did not explicitly follow the process I have
outlined and does not mention legislative history in any of the decision
90 George Nickas, Wüdemess Watch, Scoping comments. July 16,19%.
91 U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Alaska, Helicopter Landings in Wilderness (FEIS) Record of 
Decision, at 3 (1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
documents, their decision is well supported by both statutory construction 
and legislative interpretation.
The EIS explicitly rejects ANILCA as a basis for the proposal, and relies 
on the Wilderness Act as the only relevant statute. I agree with their 
interpretation and have also only considered the Wilderness Act in analyzing 
this decision. Determining the ambiguity under the Act is the same as in the 
preceding example. The plain meaning doctrine fails because of the 
ambiguity inherent between sections 2 and 4 of the Wüdemess Act. The 
canons of construction are particularly useful in determining whether this 
lapsed use should be reinstated. Whüe the Act does not define "established", 
construction can help the interpreter understand the proper meaning of this 
word. One canon states that "words in common usage should be assigned 
their ordinary meaning" (See page 16).^2  Merriam-Webster's dictionary 
defines "established" as "to provide strong evidence for", "to provide with a 
secure reputation", or "to make a norm, a custom, a convention" Three 
visits within five years does not appear to be a level of access that is on a firm 
basis’. Because of the uncertainty and limited level of the preexisting use in 
these areas, the agency had the discretion to prohibit access.
FinaUy, the interpreter must determine whether they may look to the 
legislative history to determine how to further resolve the ambiguity in the 
statutory language. Breyer's fifth circumstance - choosing between politically 
controversial alternatives - applies here.^^ As evidenced by the outcry of 
protest from both the general public and the other management agencies, the 
proposal was politically controversial. Therefore, the Forest Service could
92 SUTHERLAND, supra note 80, § 47.28 at 248.
93 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary. G. & C. Merriam Co.: Springfield MA (1976).
94 To help choose between alternatives when a statute is politically controversial." in 
Stephen Breyer The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes. S. CA L. REV. 856- 
857(1992).
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justifiably turn to extrinsic aids for assistance. In the quote from Janik’s 
decision notice, the agency clearly realized that permitting this access was not 
justified by the intent of the W ilderness Act, This intent, as outlined in 
Chapter Three and in the preceding example, focused on protection of the 
wilderness resource and its character from hum an development and 
modernization. The exception for nonconforming uses like aircraft landings 
was aimed at protecting the status quo and therefore only applied to 
established uses. The regional forester clearly saw helicopter access as 
incompatible with the Act’s mandates to protect the wilderness resource. The 
resulting decision sets a strong precedent for protecting wilderness from 
nonconforming uses.
Red's Horse Ranch on the Eagle Cap Wilderness 
The final case study examines a situation in which a final decision has 
not yet been made. In 1994, as part of the Forest Service's policy of acquiring 
any non-federal wilderness inholdings that become available,^® the agency 
purchased a former guest ranch. Red’s Horse Ranch, in Oregon’s Eagle Cap 
Wilderness.^^ The ranch has about 30 buildings, farm equipment, and an 
airstrip. Eight miles from the nearest road, the airstrip was the main form of 
access to this backcountry resort.^^ The Forest Service now must decide how 
to manage its newly acquired property. While the agency intends to 
undertake an EA to ascertain the proper use of the ranch and airstrip, it 
currently lacks the funds to do so. In the meantime, the airstrip is closed to 
the public but is being used for administrative flights. The airfield also sees 
occasional private landings from uninformed pilots. A full-time wilderness
FS MANUAL, supra note 21, 2320.3(9).
Marly Gardner, Eagle Cap Ranger District, personal communication (1997).
Richard Cockle, "Forest Service Still Has No Plan for Red's Horse Ranch", The Oregonian. 
9 /2 /9 7 , at B8.
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ranger is in residence at the ranch. H is/her duties include maintaining its 
facilities and protecting against vandals.^®
The Red's Horse Ranch management decision is an Interesting case 
study for applying Congressional intent to a discretionary management 
situation. The ambiguity in this case involves whether or not the private 
inholding airstrip within the wilderness boundary can be considered an 
established use under the terms of the Wilderness Act. While the airstrip at 
Red's Horse Ranch had been in operation since 1931, it was on private land. 
There were no airstrips in operation on federal land within the wilderness 
when the Eagle Cap Wilderness was designated in 1964.
To determine whether this use deserves statutory protection, the 
interpreter must look to the intent and purpose of the Act, From the 
statutory language it is clear that the Wilderness Act sets forth rules for 
designating and managing federal lands as wilderness. Wilderness is defined 
in section 2(c) as an area of "undeveloped Federal land".^^ The Act's 
provisions do not affect actions on private inholdings within wilderness 
boundaries. The only control the Act has over private inholdings is in 
regards to ingress and egress to lands wholly surrounded by wüdemess 
lands.^oo Thus, since the airstrip on this property was not governed by the 
Wüdemess Act prior to acquisition, it may not be considered a previously 
established use under section 4(d)(1).
Although this explanation seems self-explanatory, since this is a 
politically charged issue, the interpreter may also turn to the legislative 
history of the Act for further justification. As shown in Chapter Two, the 
W üdemess Act clearly intended the protection of wüdemess airstrips to apply
Gardner, supra note 96.
99 The Wilderness Act, supra note 6, § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
100 Id. §5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1135.
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to the 1964 status quo on federal lands. Therefore, it would be contrary to 
Congressional intent to expand this protection to airstrips on private 
inholdings. As this land was not federal in 1964, there is no established use. 
Arguing that the airstrip is protected as an established use would be similar to 
asserting that the mechanized farm equipment should be allowed to operate 
on the now NWPS property because it was established there before 
designation. In addition, the Act and agency policy provide for the 
acquisition of private and state inholdings when feasible. The purpose of 
adding to the NWPS is to expand the protection of wilderness quality lands 
nationwide. Therefore, the acquisition of land with existing nonconforming 
uses would not make sense unless those uses were terminated upon 
acquisition.
The Forest Service is facing strong pressure from previous users of 
Red’s Horse Ranch to reopen both the airstrip and guest ranch to public use. 
However, doing so would compromise both the wilderness character of the 
Eagle Cap and the integrity of wilderness protection system-wide. The agency 
needs to make a decision that is consistent with the intent of the Wilderness 
Act. This framework for legislative interpretation provides a strong 
foundation which the agency can use in support of a decision that both 
restores and protects the wilderness character of this area.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION.
The Wilderness Act of 1964 and subsequent wilderness legislation 
created a system that would ensure the preservation of some of the 
remaining wilderness in this country for future generations. Wilderness 
proponents saw the need to protect these remnants from the pressures of an 
expanding and demanding society. The preservation battle did not end with 
wilderness designation however. While wilderness legislation sought to 
foster a nationwide system of increased protection and consistent 
management; political compromises wrought along the way left loopholes in 
the laws which allow continued threats to the wilderness character of lands in 
the NWPS.
Today, wilderness managers are faced with the challenge of performing 
a host of discretionary duties in a very polarized atmosphere. They are 
constantly faced with pressures from interest groups demanding opposing 
interpretations of wilderness regulations. Where the Wilderness Act is clear 
and directive, these requests are easily dealt with; where the Act stipulates 
discretion, however, the result has usually been controversy and confusion. 
Wilderness airfields provide just one example of such a discretionary 
quandary.
Chapter Five outlined some current issues in airfield management that 
stem from the conflicting mandates of the Wilderness Act. I have described a 
process by which wilderness managers, users, and other interested parties can 
reevaluate such requests in light of the underlying purpose and intent of the 
wilderness legislation. This process uses legislative histories to interpret 
ambiguous aspects of the statute(s) in question. I have shown how this
88
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practice, which has been used by the courts for over a century, can be adapted 
to serve the needs of agencies charged with administering ambiguous 
statutes. Congress instructed the land management agencies to preserve and 
protect wild lands for future generations but did so through a statute flawed 
with ambiguity. The analytical framework I have proposed gives the agencies 
a legal and historically accurate basis on which to make its difficult 
managerial decisions.
Going back to the legislative history of the Wilderness Act, it is clear 
that wilderness proponents wanted a system that would protect 
"untrammeled" areas, provide a place where natural processes would 
dominate, and where humans could go to experience solitude and primitive 
forms of recreation. They reduced opposition by preserving the status quo. In 
three wilderness areas in Idaho and Montana, this meant retaining airfields 
within wilderness. Additional protection of this particular nonconforming 
use was added in later years by the Central Idaho Wüdemess Act (CIWA) and 
the committee report accompanying the Great Bear Wüdemess Act.
Applying the process of statutory interpretation and construction to 
these three legislative documents provides a clearer idea of Congressional 
intent regarding wüdemess airstrips. The legislative history of the 
Wüdemess Act demonstrates the strong preservationist intent of the Act's 
sponsors and the political realities that led them to include such incompatible 
preexisting uses. Two other things are also clear from these documents; 1) 
while Congress would permit existing airstrips to remain, their use was to 
continue at existing levels and 2) the Secretary was to have discretionary duty 
to regulate these airfields to reduce conflicts with wilderness values, the 
character of the area, and other users.
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The CIWA reduced much of the agency’s discretion to close airstrips 
but nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggest any intention to 
limit its ability to regulate use levels at existing airstrips. The committee 
report on the Great Bear Wilderness, which contains Congressional direction 
regarding the Schafer Airstrip, reiterated the Wilderness Act's intention to 
m aintain existing airfields but explicitly recognized the agency's responsibility 
to regulate this use to be more compatible w ith wUdemess values.
This type of statutory and legislative analysis provides managers with a 
firmer grasp of both their Congressionally mandated responsibilities and the 
ideals underlying them. The preservationist ideals of the sponsors of the 
Wilderness Act apparent from this analysis provide the agency with the 
rationale it needs to protect wilderness values.
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